THE "HEART CASES" IN WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION: AN ANALYSIS AND
SUGGESTED SOLUTION
Arthur Larson*
compensability of heart attacks continues to be probably the
most prolific and troublesome problem in workmen's compensation law.
There is nothing complex about the typical fact situation. A
worker whose customary duties involve lifting 100-pound sacks from
a floor onto a platform suffers a heart attack immediately after one
such exertion. Is this an "injury by accident arising out of and in the
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course of employment"? The range of precipitating events can be
as broad and as varied as the entire spectrum of exertions or emotional conditions capable of contributing to the onset of a heart
attack, from walking up a flight of stairs to engaging in a heated
argument with a supervisor.
The gravity of this problem within the workmen's compensation
system is not surprising. Given the dominant position of heart disease as a source of disability and death, the extent to which workmen's compensation assumes both medical and income maintenance
responsibility for the victims of heart disease naturally has a heavy
bearing on the comprehensiveness, cost, and ultimate direction of
the system. Obviously if the heart attack is a genuinely work-connected injury, to deny compensation benefits would be a gross violation of the legislative purpose and of the workman's rights. It is
equally obvious that, under the coverage clause quoted at the outset,
compensation cannot be paid for every heart attack which happens
to make its appearance during working hours. Thus, the task of the
courts, armed with little more than this generally-worded coverage
formula, has been to draw the line between the legitimate application of the Act and the indiscriminate distribution of compensation
funds to almost all employed heart victims.
It is one of the great tragedies of the workmen's compensation
story that almost all courts, in their perfectly justifiable search for a
legal barrier that would keep compensation heart liability from
getting out of hand, have seized upon the wrong component in the
coverage formula. The words "by accident" or their equivalent were
pressed into service for this task, and they have proved to be a most
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ill-fitting tool for this function. If the courts had followed the more
logical course of testing these cases by the causal principle prescribed
by the words "arising out of the employment," there would still
have been difficult evidentiary questions of medical causation, but
we would have been spared the Niagara of intricate and frustrating
decisions that have struggled with the intellectually unmanageable
question: When does a heart attack occur by accident?
I.

THE

REQUIREMENT OF ACCIDENTAL INJURY

Since the heart cases rest almost entirely on the "by accident"
provision in workmen's compensation statutes, we must begin by
indicating briefly the present posture of statutory law. The requirement that the injury be accidental in character has been adopted
either legislatively or judicially by all but six states.' The usual
phrase found in statutes containing the requirement is injury "by
accident," a phrase taken from the original British Act. This phrase
occurs in the statutes of thirty states.2 Nine states,3 the District of
Columbia, and the Longshoremen's Act use the phrase "accidental
injury." The Ohio Code introduces the "accidental" factor by defining injury to include "any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result," 4 while Montana
and Washington choose different wording, the former preferring
"from an unexpected cause" 5 and the latter "a sudden and tangible
happening, of a traumatic nature." In three states, Michigan, West
Virginia, and Wyoming, the basic coverage clause does not contain
an express accident requirement, but the word "accident" is used
elsewhere in the statute, usually to fix the beginning of the period
in which notice of injury must be given or claim must be made. The
courts of these three states have read "accidental" into the coverage
1. The six states are California, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and
Texas. Rhode Island deleted the requirement in 1949. R.I. Laws 1949, ch. 2282.
Minnesota removed the word "accident" in 1953. Minn. Laws 1953, ch. 755, § 2. The
United States Employees' Compensation Act also omits the requirement. 89 Stat. 742
(1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 751a (1964).
2. Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
S. Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, Oklahoma, and Oregon.
4. OHio RV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01 (Page 1965).
5. The Montana statute, which formerly called for "some fortuitous event," was
amended to substitute the quoted language in 1961. MONT. RIV. CODFS ANN. § 92"418

(1963).
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clause," although Michigan has all but read it out again.7 Texas
also began to read accidental into the coverage clause but later held
that the term "injury" covered all injuries whether accidental or
not.8
When we turn to the decisional interpretation of the "by accident" concept, we discover several components. The basic and indispensable ingredient of "accident" is unexpectedness. The first leading English case, Fenton v. J.Thorley & Company,9 embodied this
factor in the following definition: "an unlooked for mishap or an
untoward event which is not expected or designed."' 1 Up to this
point, it can be seen that there is nothing in the "accident" requirement which seriously circumscribes liability in heart cases. There
would be almost no heart attacks which are "expected or designed"
as the result of whatever the claimant was doing, for, if the claimant
expected a heart attack or death as a result of his action, he presumably would have avoided the action. Indeed, the difficulties and the
voluminous litigation that have swirled around the accident concept
have flowed not from this common-sense dictionary meaning of "by
accident," but from two very questionable limitations or distortions
of the term, limitations which may or may not have been consciously
adopted in order to build a retaining wall around liability in heart
and comparable cases.
The first of these two misreadings was the subtle conversion of
the phrase "accidental injury" or the equivalent phrase "injury by
accident" into the phrase "by an accident." This is unjustifiable
both as a matter of grammar and as a matter of statutory intention.
In the original British formula, "personal injury by accident arising
out of and in the course of employment," and in the many statutes
which have adopted this exact wording, the phrase "by accident" is
clearly a modifier meaning the same as "accidental."" True, the
6. Michigan: Arnold v. Ogle Constr. Co., 333 Mich. 652, 53 N.W.2d 655 (1952);
Marlowe v. Huron Mountain Club, 271 Mich. 107, 260 N.W. 130 (1935); see note 25
infra for a detailed discussion. West Virginia: Martin v. State Compensation Comm'n,
107 W. Va. 583, 149 S.E. 824 (1929); Archibald v. Compensation Comm'r, 77 W. Va.
448, 87 S.E. 791 (1916), 1916D L.R.A. (n.s.) 1013. Wyoming: In re Scrogham, 52 Wyo.
232, 73 P.2d 200 (1937); Pero v. Collier-Latimer, Inc., 49 Wyo. 131, 52 P.2d 690 (1935).
7. See notes 30-43 infra and accompanying text.
8. Texas Employers' Ins. AMs'n v. Mincey, 255 S.W.2d 262 (rex. Civ. App. 1953).
The statement in Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556
(1916), that the statute covered only industrial accidents, was intended merely to
distinguish wilful injuries, the remedy for which was thought to be guarded by the
Texas Constitution.
9. [1903] A.C. 443.
10. Id. at 448.
11. "It was held that 'injury by accident' meant nothing more than 'accidental
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wording in some state acts has been altered so that "accident" has
become the noun, itself modified by the "arising" phrase, but this is
not true of the formula in its original and most common version.
Of course, having once rewritten the statute so as to read "by an
accident," the courts were then in a position to set forth on their
endless search for "the accident" in heart cases and other situations
in which there did not happen to be some obvious industrial mishap
or highway collision.
An even greater source of difficulty in the heart cases has been
the gratuitous insistence by many courts that the accidental quality
of the episode be found in the cause rather than in the result. The
most familiar manifestation of this insistence is the development of
the "unusual-exertion" requirement for compensability in heart
cases. To refer again to our original case of the man who has lifted
100-pound sacks many times a day and then suffers a heart attack
while lifting one such sack in the usual way: It is evident that if a
court construes the idea of an "untoward event" or "unlooked for
mishap" as confined exclusively to the cause, that is, the outward
circumstances immediately preceding the injury, nothing unexpected can be shown. But if accidental content can be supplied by
the unexpected effect on this individual, then the injury can correctly be described as accidental.
This entire controversy should have been and could have been
avoided if the courts had followed the well-settled doctrine that
when a legislature adopts a statute which has already been authoritatively construed, it has adopted that construction.' 2 Well before
any American states copied the "injury by accident" terminology of
the British Act, it was settled beyond question in England that, although the cause of injury was routine and not accidental, a claim
was compensable if the effect on the employee was unexpected and
catastrophic, and therefore accidental. The House of Lords considered this exact situation in 190313 and again in 1910.14 In the latter

case, the routine strain of tightening a nut caused an aneurysm to
break, and this was held to be injury by accident. In February, 1912,
Professor Bohlen wrote an article which was widely read as a guide
injury'...." Lord MacNaghten in Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, [1910] A.C. 242,

248, 3 B.W.C.C. 775, 781.
12. Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 99 Utah 28, 96 P.2d 722 (1939).
13. Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co., [1903] A.C. 443.
14. Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, [1910] A.C. 242, 3 B.W.C.C. 775. For a good
review of the English cases before and since this case, and of the Australian cases, see
Ford, Workmen's Compensation-"Injury by Accident," 4 REs JUDIcATAE 160 (1949).
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to the drafting of compensation acts, pointing out these cases as
establishing the authoritative meaning of the phrase. 15 In spite of
this background, however, a substantial number of American jurisdictions adopted the requirement that a heart attack, to be compensable, must have been produced by an exertion that was unusual
for the particular worker.
The jurisdictions which allow recovery for heart attacks caused
by usual exertion now outnumber by almost two to one those that
require unusual exertion. This is not to suggest that the exact position of each jurisdiction can be classified with precision, but rather
to give an overall impression of the present state of compensation
law. Precision is impossible for many reasons, including contradictory decisions within jurisdictions, conflicts between abstract statements of rules and actual holdings on the facts, and assorted variants,
exceptions, and distinctions that defy classification. With these
preliminary caveats, one may hazard the statement that heart attacks
from usual exertion may be compensable under federal decisions,' 6
and in twenty states,17 while twelve jurisdictions still appear to
require unusual exertion.' 8
15. Bohlen, A Problem in the Draftingof Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HIv.
L. REV. 328, 337-43 (1912).
16. Hancock v. Einbinder, 310 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1962), under District of Columbia
Compensation Act; Vinson v. Einbinder, 307 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Southern
Stevedoring Co. v. Henderson, 175 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949), under Longshoremen's Act;
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 124 F. Supp. 320 (D.D.C. 1954); Jenkins v. American
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 113 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Tenn. 1953); Oceanic Fisheries Co. v.
Alaska Industrial Ed., 109 F. Supp. 103 (D. Alaska 1953); Harbor Marine Contracting Co.
v. Lowe, 61 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 152 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1945), under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act.
17. Alabama: W. T. Smith Lumber Co. v. Raines, 271 Ala. 671, 127 So. 2d 619 (1961).
Arizona: Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cabarga, 79 Ariz. 148, 285 P.2d 605 (1955); cf. Pierce
v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436, 26 P.2d 1017 (1933).
Arkansas: Rebsamen West, Inc. v. Bailey, 396 S.W.2d 822 (Ark. 1965); Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Shinn, 235 Ark. 314, 357 S.W.2d 661 (1962); Johnson v. Bear Brand
Roofing, Inc., 233 Ark. 639, 346 S.W.2d 472 (1961); International Paper Co. v. Myers, 233
Ark. 378, 345 S.W.2d 1 (1961); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Dorman, 232 Ark. 749,
340 S.W.2d 266 (1960); Freeman v. Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 232 Ark. 654, 339 S.W.2d
427 (1960); Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 187 S.W.2d 961 (1945);
McGregor & Pickett v. Arrington, 206 Ark. 921, 175 S.W.2d 210 (1943); cf. the following
cases in which the outcome is dependent upon which rule was followed by the Commission: Latimer v. Sevier County Farmers' Co-op., Inc., 233 Ark. 762, 346 S.W.2d 673
(1961); Duke v. Pekin Wood Prods. Co., 223 Ark. 182, 264 S.W.2d 834 (1954); C. & B.
Constr. Co. v. Roach, 220 Ark. 405, 248 S.W.2d 368 (1952); Farmer v. L. H. Knight Co.,
220 Ark. 333, 248 S.W.2d 111 (1952); Baker v. Slaughter, 220 Ark. 325, 248 S.W.2d 106

(1952).
Georgia: Burson v. Howell, 112 Ga. App. 675, 145 S.E.2d 718 (1965); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Poole, 112 Ga. App. 527, 145 S.E.2d 615 (1965); Callaway Mills Co. v. Yates,
106 Ga. App. 9, 126 S.E.2d 305 (1962); Fulton County v. Windsor, 100 Ga. App. 237, 110
S.E.2d 594 (1959); Georgia Dep't of Revenue v. Hughes, 99 Ga. App. 127, 108 S.E.2d 184
(1959); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 99 Ga. App. 124, 108 S.E.2d 180 (1959); Atlanta
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Newspapers v. Clements, 88 Ga. App. 648, 76 S.E.2d 830 (1953); Federated Mut.
Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Elliot, 88 Ga. App. 266, 76 S.E.2d 568 (1953); Pacific
Employer's Ins. Co. v. Donaldson, 81 Ga. App. 629, 59 S.E.2d 529 (1950); Lumbermen's
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Kitchens, 81 Ga. App. 470, 59 S.E.2d 270 (1950). But cf. Gurin v.
Bituminous Cas. Co., 107 Ga. App. 823, 131 S.E.2d 566 (1963).
Idaho: Laird v. State Highway Dep't, 80 Idaho 12, 323 P.2d 1079 (1958); Lewis v.
Department of Law Enforcement, 79 Idaho 40, 811 P.2d 976 (1957); Smith v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 72 Idaho 8, 236 P.2d 87 (1951); Warlick v. Driscoll, 68 Idaho 552, 200 P.2d
1014 (1948); Teater v. Dairymen's Co-op. Creamery, 68 Idaho 152, 190 P.2d 687 (1948).
But cf. Brown v. Stevens, 84 Idaho 432, 373 P.2d 832 (1962); Sutton v. Brown's Tie &
Lumber Co., 83 Idaho 265, 361 P.2d 793 (1961); Dunn v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 74
Idaho 210, 260 P.2d 398 (1953); Swan v. Williamson, 74 Idaho 32, 257 P.2d 552 (1953);
Carrie v. Carrie, 78 Idaho 503, 254 P.2d 410 (1953).
Illinois: Bruno v. Industrial Comm'n, 31 Ill. 2d 447, 202 N.E.2d 13 (1964); CliffordJacobs Forging Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 286, 166 N.E.2d 582 (1960); Laclede
Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ill. 2d 296, 128 N.E.2d 718 (1955); Bethlehem Steel
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 II. 2d 290, 128 N.E.2d 714 (1955); Town of Cicero v.
Industrial Comm'n, 404 Ill. 487, 89 N.E.2d 854 (1949).
Kansas: Geurian v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 192 Kan. 589, 889 P.2d 782
(1964); Pence v. Centex Constr. Co., 189 Kan. 718, 871 P.2d 100 (1962); Kare v. Board of
Comm'rs, 188 Kan. 800, 866 P.2d 241 (1961); Bohanan v. Schlozman Ford, Inc., 188 Kan.
795, 366 P.2d 28 (1961); Price v. McSpaden, 188 Kan. 578, 363 P.2d 533 (1961); Thuillez
v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 187 Kan. 618, 358 P.2d 676 (1961); Alpers v. GeorgeNielsen Motor Co., 182 Kan. 790, 824 P.2d 177 (1958); Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co.,
180 Kan. 295, 803 P.2d 197 (1956); Peterson v. Safeway Stores, 158 Kan. 271, 146 P.2d
657 (1944); Hill v. Etchen Motor Co., 148 Kan. 655, 56 P.2d 103 (1936); cf Transmeier v.
Blaw-Knox Constr. Co., 191 Kan. 321, 380 P.2d 322 (1963).
Kentucky: Johnson v. Stone, 357 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1962). See also Grimes v. Goodlett
& Adams, 345 S.V.2d 47 (Ky. 1961); Terry v. Associated Stone Co., 334 S.W.2d 926 (Ky.
1960); cf. Nashville Coal Co. v. Epley, 350 S.W.2d 463 (Ky. 1961); Salmon v. Armco Steel
Corp., 275 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1955); H. Smith Coal Co. v. Marshall, 243 S.W.2d 40 (Ky.
1951).
Louisiana: Prater v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 182 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 1966); Richard
v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 247 La. 943, 175 So. 2d 277 (1965); Spivey v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 127 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 1961); McKnight v. Clemons, 114 So. 2d 114
(La. App. 1959); Brian v. Employers Cas. Co., 111 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 1959); Sharp v.
Esso Standard Oil Co., 72 So. 2d 601 (La. App. 1954).
Maine: Taylor's Case, 127 Me. 207, 142 Atl. 730 (1928).
Michigan: Zaremba v. Chrysler Corp., 377 Mich. 226, 189 N.W.2d 745 (1966);
Mottonen v. Calumet & Hecla, Inc., 360 Mich. 659, 105 N.W.2d 33 (1960); Barger v.
City of Saginaw, 358 Mich. 423, 100 N.W.2d 208 (1960). The following cases applying an
earlier rule are now obsolete: Wieda v. American Box Board Co., 343 Mich. 182, 72
N.W.2d 13 (1955); McGregor v. Michigan Dep't of Conservation, 338 Mich. 93, 61
N.W.2d 68 (1953); O'Neil v. W.R. Spencer Grocer Co., 316 Mich. 320, 25 N.W.2d 213
(1946); Poindexter v. Department of Conservation, 316 Mich. 235, 25 N.W.2d 182
(1946).
Mississippi: I.B.S. Mfg. Co. v. Dependents of Cook, 241 Miss. 256, 130 So. 2d 557
(1961); Pennington v. Dependents of Smith, 232 Miss. 775, 100 So. 2d 569 (1958);
Schilling v. Mississippi State Forestry Comm'n, 226 Miss. 858, 85 So. 2d 562 (1956);
Thornbrough Well Servicing Co. v. Brown, 223 Miss. 322, 78 So. 2d 159 (1955).
Montana: Murphy v. Anaconda Co., 133 Mont. 198, 321 P.2d 1094 (1958); Rathbun
v. Taber Tank Lines, 129 Mont. 121, 283 P.2d 966 (1955).
New Jersey: Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487, 178 A.2d 161 (1962); Ciuba v.
Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co., 27 N.J. 127, 141 A.2d 761 (1958).
Oklahoma: C. T. Hughes Constr. Co. v. Phillips, 401 P.2d 498 (Okla. 1965); H. J.
Jefferies Truck Line v. Grisham, 397 P.2d 637 (Okla. 1964); Lea Mach. Co. v. Emmons,
595 P.2d 857 (Okla. 1964); Co-operative Publishing Co. v. Jestes, 373 P.2d 33 (Okla.
1962); Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Orum, 366 P.2d 919 (Okla. 1961); Rigdon & Bruen Oil Co.
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II.

THE MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE

Before undertaking an analytical judgment concerning the optimum working rule for heart cases, one may first set the stage by
tracing in detail two of the more interesting attempts by states to
arrive at a solution. The Michigan experience is significant because
it provides one of the most dramatic illustrations of the over-all
trend in the heart cases. Michigan began establishing restrictions
based on the "accident" concept without even having a "by accident" limitation in its basic statutory coverage clause. However, in
v. Beerman, 346 P.2d 169 (Okla. 1959); State Highway Dep't v. Powell, 258 P.2d 1189
(Okla. 1953); Boettcher Oil & Gas Co. v. Lamb, 208 Okla. 192, 255 P.2d 277 (1958); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Rouse, 202 Okla. 895, 214 P.2d 251 (1949); Clarksburg Paper Co. v. Roper,
196 Okla. 504, 166 P.2d 425 (1946).
Oregon: Olson v. State Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 222 Ore. 407, 352 P.2d 1096 (1960).
Tennessee: Blair v. Aluminum Co. of America, 217 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Tenn. 1962);
Gluck Bros. v. Breeden, 387 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. 1965); Ward v. Commercial Ins. Co.,
213 Tenn. 100, 372 S.W.2d 292 (1963); Coleman v. Coker, 204 Tenn. 810, 821 S.W.2d
540 (1959); Lay v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 196 Tenn. 63, 264 S.W.2d 223 (1953);
Patterson Transfer Co. v. Lewis, 195 Tenn. 474, 260 S.W.2d 182 (1953); cf. Hagewood
v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 206 Tenn. 289, 82 S.W.2d 660 (1960).
Texas: Midwestern Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 870 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); United
States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Herzik, 359 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Texas
Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Frazier, 259 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Texas Employers
Ins. Ass'n v. Smith, 285 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Southern Underwriters v.
Hoopes, 120 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1988).
Utah: The heart cases in Utah which appeared to require overexertion have been
expressly superseded by the generally-applicable rule laid down in Purity Biscuit Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949), an intervertebral disc award.
West Virginia: Gilbert v. Compensation Comm'r, 121 W. Va. 10, 1 S.E.2d 167 (1939).
18. Colorado: Skinner v. Industrial Comm'n, 152 Colo. 97, 881 P.2d 253 (1963);
Industrial Comm'n v. Hesler, 149 Colo. 592, 370 P.2d 428 (1962); Huff v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
146 Colo. 63, 360 P.2d 667 (1961).
Delaware: Faline v. Guido & Francis DeAscanis & Sons, 192 A.2d 921 (Del. 1963).
Florida: Friendly Frost Used Appliances v. Reiser, 152 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1963); cf.
Gray v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 64 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1953), which accepted the
unexpected-result rule.
Indiana: Douglas v. Warner Gear Div. of Borg Warner Corp., 181 Ind. App. 664,
174 N.E.2d 584 (1961); cf. Slaubaugh v. Vore, 123 Ind. App. 497, 110 N.E.2d 299 (1958).
Missouri: State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 319, 158 S.W.2d
40 (1941); Flippin v. First Nat'l Bank, 372 S.W.2d 278 (Springfield, Mo., Ct. App. 1963);
Joiner v. Farmers Exchange Co-op. Ass'n No. 804, 868 S.W.2d 547 (Kansas City, Mo., Ct.
App. 1963); Love v. Land, 856 S.W.2d 105 (Kansas City, Mo., Ct. App. 1962).
Nebraska: Cochran v. Bellevue Bridge Comm'n, 174 Neb. 761, 119 N.W.2d 292 (1963);
Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d 552 (1945); Rose v. City of Fairmont, 140
Neb. 550, 800 N.W. 574 (1941).
North Carolina: Ferrel v. Montgomery & Aldridge Sales Co., 262 N.C. 76, 136
S.E.2d 227 (1964); Bellamy v. Morace Stevedoring Co., 258 N.C. 827, 128 S.E.2d 395
(1962); West v. North Carolina Dep't of Conservation & Dev., 229 N.C. 282, 49 S.E.2d 398
(1948).
Ohio: Meese v. Wylie, 169 Ohio St. 252, 158 N.E.2d 891 (1959); Gerlich v. Republic
Steel Corp., 153 Ohio St. 463, 92 N.E.2d 893 (1950); McNees v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 152
Ohio St. 269, 89 N.E.2d 188 (1949); Nelson v. Industrial Comm'n, 150 Ohio St. 1, 80
N.E.2d 480 (1948); Stewart v. Young, 112 Ohio App. 433, 176 N.E.2d 822 (1961); Heath v.
Standard Oil Co., 68 Ohio L. Abs. 571, 112 N.E.2d 405 (Ct. App. 1953).
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common with two other jurisdictions, 9 Michigan read the "accidental" requirement into the coverage formula anyway, and, so
equipped, proceeded to develop a typical line of cases denying compensation in the absence of unusual exertion. For example, compensation was denied for heart attacks suffered by a salesman while
driving in a snow storm, 20 a fire warden while performing his du22
ties, 21 and an employee while testifying in court.
At the same time, Michigan, like every other jurisdiction with
the unusual-exertion requirement, was occasionally producing a case
which gave the unmistakable impression of clutching at straws in
order to save awards by finding unusualness in the most trivial circumstances. For example, in Schlange v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 23 a coronary thrombosis was attributed to the workman's "performing his
usual work in an unusual manner and with the exertion of unusual
force." The unusualness arose from the fact that the workman was
using a round collet instead of a hexagonal one to hold a hexagonal
fixture, and extra effort was required because of the tendency of the
fixture to slip.
An important part in the unfolding Michigan story was contributed by the legislature in 1943 when it removed all but five of the

fifty-four uses of the word "accident" in the Act and introduced the
"single-event" test.24 One of the few places from which the accident
Pennsylvania: Good v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Property & Supplies, 346 Pa. 151, 80
A.2d 434 (1943); McGowan v. Upper Darby Pet Supply, 207 Pa. Super. 329, 217 A.2d
846 (1966); Shatto v. Bardinet Exports, Inc., 170 Pa. Super. 16, 84 A.2d 388 (1951); Cope
v. Philadelphia Toilet Laundry & Supply Co., 167 Pa. Super. 205, 74 A.2d 775 (1950);
Powell v. Hills Garage, 150 Pa. Super. 17, 27 A.2d 778 (1942).
South Carolina: Walker v. City of Columbia, 146 S.E.2d 856 (S.C. 1966); Lorick v.
South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 245 S.C. 513, 141 S.E.2d 662 (1965); Jones v. Williamsburg County, 245 S.C. 434, 141 S.E.2d 100 (1965); Rhodes v. Guignard Brick Works, 245
S.C. 304, 140 S.E.2d 487 (1965); Black v. Barnwell County, 243 S.C. 531, 134 S.E.2d 753
(1964); West v. City of Spartanburg, 236 S.C. 553, 115 S.E.2d 295 (1960); Sims v. South
Carolina Comm'n of Forestry, 235 S.C. 1, 109 S.E.2d 701 (1959); Price v. B. F. Shaw
Co., 224 S.C. 89, 77 S.E.2d 491 (1953).
South Dakota: Cooper v. Vinatieri, 73 S.D. 418, 43 N.W.2d 747 (1950).
Washington: Windust v. Department of Labor & Indus., 52 Wash. 2d 33, 323 P.2d
241 (1958), overruling Merritt v. Department of Labor & Indus., 41 Wash. 2d 633, 251
P.2d 158 (1952), and McCormick Lumber Co. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 7
Wash. 2d 40, 108 P.2d 807 (1941). See also Taylor v. Department of Labor & Indus., 416
P.2d 455 (Wash. 1966); Warner v. Department of Labor & Indus., 414 P.2d 628 (Wash.
1966); Lawson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 63 Wash. 2d 79, 385 P.2d 537 (1963);
Kruse v. Department of Labor & Indus., 52 Wash. 2d 453, 326 P.2d 58 (1958).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See note 6 supra.
O'Neil v. W. R. Spencer Grocer Co., 316 Mich. 320, 25 N.W.2d 213 (1946).
McGregor v. Michigan Dep't of Conservation, 338 Mich. 93, 61 N.W.2d 68 (1953).
Poindexter v. Department of Conservation, 316 Mich. 235, 25 N.W.2d 182 (1946).
326 Mich. 552, 40 N.W.2d 454 (1950).
Mich. Pub. Acts 1943, No. 245.
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concept was not removed was the title, where the reference to compensation for accidental injuries was retained. After a period of
some uncertainty, the Michigan Supreme Court specifically concluded, by a vote of five to three, that accidental injury was still
25
required despite the 1943 amendments.
Coming changes in legal doctrine are often heralded by a persuasive dissenting opinion. In the Michigan heart cases, this function was performed by the dissenting opinion of Justice Smith in
Wieda v. American Box Board Company,26 a case in which the
majority denied compensation for a coronary thrombosis. The dissent examined both the general effect of the 1943 amendments on
the accident requirement and the specific application of the statute
to unexpected-result and usual-exertion heart cases. As to the former,
27
justice, Smith said:
It will be observed that the insertion of the suggested word "accidental" has been rejected. It should also be noted that the same
amendment undertook a wholesale excision of the words "accident"
and "accidental injury," from other portions of the act, and the
substitution of the word "injury."
As to the latter, he said that the word "accident" includes both the
expected cause and the expected result,28 and he adduced the following quotation from the original English case of Fenton v. J.Thorley
29
Company:
If a man, in lifting a weight or trying to move something not
easily moved, were to strain a muscle or rick his back, or rupture
himself, the mishap in ordinary parlance would be described as an
accident. Anybody would say that the man had met with an accident
in lifting a weight, or trying to move something too heavy for him.
The decisions which finally reversed the Michigan rule were not
heart cases, but there was never any doubt that the heart cases were
embraced within the new principles established in Sheppard v.
25. Arnold v. Ogle Constr. Co., 333 Mich. 652, 53 N.W.2d 655 (1952). For a discussion
of the varying points of view on the significance of cases between the 1943 amendments
and Arnold, see the opinions in Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83
N.W.2d 614 (1957). The principal cases during this period include: Kasarewski v. Hupp
Motor Car Corp., 315 Mich. 225, 23 N.W.2d 689 (1946); Anderson v. General Motors
Corp., 313 Mich. 630, 22 N.W.2d 108 (1946); Hagopian v. Highland Park, 313 Mich.
608, 22 N.W.2d 116 (1946).
26. 343 Mich. 182, 72 N.W.2d 13 (1955).

27. Id. at 203, 72 N.W.2d at 24.
28. Id. at 196, 72 N.W.2d at 19.
29. [1903] A.C. 443, at 446. For previous discussion of Fenton, see text accompanying
notes 9 & 10 supra.
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3 1 Sheppard inMichigan National Bank o and Coombe v. Penegor.
volved a back injury which occurred when claimant tugged at a tray
of cards weighing about twenty-five pounds. Coombe involved a cerebral hemorrhage and stroke resulting from the claimant's strenuous
but usual exertion in fastening logs onto a logging truck with chains.
For anyone having more than a passing interest in this topic in
Michigan, the eighty pages of opinion, concurring opinions, dissenting opinions, and addenda in the report of these two cases are
required reading. The reader's task will be lightened by the fact
that there is a sense of high drama pervading these printed pages
which shines through in some of the most vivid legal writing imaginable. The language of the battlefield repeatedly turns up in the
opinions. Justice Black, in his first opinion in Coombe, after citing
a number of conflicting opinions, asked: "Who is to say, until we
do, which of these warring groups of decisions shall determine [the]
applicability of part 7?"32 Again, in his opening opinion in Sheppard,
Justice Black wrote:

Brazauskis (Brazauskis v. Muskegon County Board of Road Commissioners, 345 Mich. 480), the 4 to 4 deadlock of April 2d last, and
now the misshapen 3-2-2 monster known as Beltinck's Case (Beltinck
v. Mt. Pleasant State Home and Training School, 346 Mich. 494),
unitedly prove the parable. Indeed, they liken us to the Etruscan
array, faltering at Tiber's bridge. Here we stand, wavering from
term to term, fearful of unvarnished avowal, pictured as by Macaulay's pen:
"But those behind cried 'Forwardl'
And those before cried 'Backl' ,8
Finally, Justice Edwards, concurring in Sheppard, on learning that
a clear majority of the court had now appeared for the new rule,
appended an addendum beginning with the cry of triumph: "Say
34
not, the struggle naught availeth."
What clearly emerges from the dust of battle is that the accidental quality of an injury in Michigan can now be supplied by an
unexpected result, that unusual exertion is not indispensable in
heart and similar cases, and that pre-existing weakness or disease
30. 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d 614 (1957).
31. 348 Mich. 635, 83 N.W.2d 603 (1957).
32. Id. at 640, 83 N.W,2d at 606.
33. 348 Mich. at 579, 83 N.W.2d at 627. The lines of poetry are from Horatius
stanza 50, in MACAULEY'S LAYS OF ANCIENT ROME (1928).
34. 348 Mich. at 627, 83 N.W.2d at 636. The quote is the first line of Arthur Hugh
Clough's, "Say not the Struggle Naught availeth," found in the OxFoRD BooK OF ENGLSH VERSE, 1250-1918, at 898 (Quiller-Couch ed. 1940).
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does not alter this basic rule. What is not quite so clear is whether
the court has gone all the way in removing the accident requirement
from the statute, undoing what was started by the Marlowe case,3 5
and what was given a new lease on life by the Arnold case. 36 In
Sheppard and Coombe, all of the concurring justices except Justice
Edwards stopped short of announcing a blanket elimination of the
accident concept from the Michigan statute. There are a number of
statements to the effect that the 1943 amendments eliminated the
accident concept as previously interpreted by the court, and that the
concept was abolished once and for all insofar as it formerly required an accidental or unexpected cause. But Justice Smith, in his
concurring opinion in Sheppard, said:
Eula Sheppard and Ewart Coombe are each entitled to compensation, not because we "eliminate" accident from the act, not because
of the presence or lack of a pre-existing ailment . . . but simply
because each suffered an unexpected mishap (an accident, in our
everyday speech) while doing his ordinary work in his ordinary way. 3 7
Justice Black, who wrote the primary opinion for the majority,
announced that he was signing this opinion of Justice Smith. The
opinions of Justice Edwards and Chief Justice Dethmers are designated merely as "concurring," i.e., presumably concurring with
the primary opinion of Justice Smith. Justice Kelly, in turn, concurred
with Chief Justice Dethmers, but in the process evenhandedly
divided his approval between those of the justices who accepted the
accident requirement and even extended it to require an accidental
result as well as cause, and of Justice Edwards, whom Justice Kelly
quoted as saying: "There is no longer a requirement that 'an accident' or 'a fortuitous' event (this court's previous definition of 'accident') be proven as a condition precedent for recovery of workmen's
compensation for a single-event personal injury which arises out of
and during the course of employment."38 There is thus some question of precisely what Justice Kelly concurred in.
This is not the end of the matter. In 1960, Justice Edwards found
himself in the position of writing the majority opinion in the case
which clearly applied the new doctrine to a heart attack, Mottonen
v. Calumet & Hecla, Inc. 9 Understandably, Justice Edwards in85. 271 Mich. 107, 260 N.W. 130 (1935).
86. 833 Mich. 652, 53 N.W.2d 655 (1952).

37. 348 Mich. at 605, 83 N.W.2d at 626. (Emphasis supplied by the court.)
38. Id. at 634, 88 N.W.2d at 640.
39. 860 Mich. 659, 105 N.W.2d 3 (1960).
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serted into the majority opinion of Mottonen his own interpretation
of Sheppard and Coombe:
The Sheppard and Coombe Cases served to eliminate from construction of the Michigan workmen's compensation statute the
former case-law requirement of proof of an accident ("a fortuitous
circumstance") (see Arnold v. Ogle Construction Co., 333 Mich. 652)
as a condition precedent to recovery of compensation where statutorily-required proofs were present.40
Although this restatement of his own interpretation is not surprising, there may be some significance in the fact that Justice
Edward's opinion was concurred in by three other justices, including Justice Smith, who said explicitly in Sheppard that the basis of
the Sheppard and Coombe opinions was not that accident was
"eliminated" from the act.
Although it is something of an anti-climax after this excursion
through the byways of the judicial process, one must nevertheless
observe that it probably does not make very much difference in
heart and other strain cases whether one accepts Justice Edward's
view that Sheppard and Coombe eliminated the accident requirement, or the more cautious interpretation that they simply established the unexpected-result and usual-exertion rules. This observation is supported by the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in
Zaremba v. Chrysler Corporation,41 in which one final attempt to
make the Sheppard and Coombe rule stop short of the usual-exertion
test was firmly put down by the court. The Workmen's Compensation Board's interpretation of the cases was rejected and the court
held that the exertion which caused disability or death did not have
to be "strenuous" in character. The supreme court quoted from the
42
Arkansas case of Bryant Stave & Heading Company v. White:
Notwithstanding anything we may have said in prior cases, we
hold that an accidental injury arises out of the employment when
the required exertion producing the injury is too great for the person undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the
condition of his health, provided the exertion is either the sole or a
contributory cause of the injury. In short, that an injury is accidental when either the cause or result is unexpected or accidental,
although the work being done is usual or ordinary. [Emphasis by
the Michigan Supreme Court.]
40.
41.
42.
Corp.,

Id.
377
227
377

at 660, 105 N.W.2d at 33.
Mich. 226, 139 N.W.2d 745 (1966).
Ark. 147, 155, 296 S.W.2d 486, 441 (1956), quoted in Zaremba v. Chrysler
Mich. 226, 231, 139 N.W.2d 745, 748 (1966). This same language was also

quoted by Justice Smith in Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 848 Mich. 577, 582-85, 85
N.W.2d 614, 615 (1957).
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This quotation is followed by the statement: "It is difficult to tell
from the 5 separate opinions [in Sheppard] exactly what the case
stood for then and what it stands for now. If it does not stand for
the foregoing quoted rule, I think it ought to."' 43 Four justices concurred in this opinion, while three justices concurred separately on
the ground that the Commission was warranted in finding that the
employee's work was unrelated to his heart attack. Consequently,
for whatever the observation is worth, we now seem to have at least
a five to three majority agreeing upon the meaning of Sheppard. So
understood, the Michigan rule as to the range of heart and similar
cases which are compensable as accidental injuries is now as generous
as that of any jurisdiction in the country.

III. THE NEw YoRK EXPERIENCE
The other state whose experience deserves detailed examination
is New York. The history of what has happened in New York is of
prime interest to any state which is still trying to apply the unusualexertion test, because it shows what happens to that rule when a
sufficient volume and variety of cases puts it to every possible test.
The net result amounts to this: New York began with an emphatic
requirement of unusual and even catastrophic cause, but, by a gradual decrease in the "unusualness" of the unusual cause required, it
reached a point where, in effect, any heart attack to which the employment contributed seemed to be held accidental; then, apparently impressed by the need for some principle that would keep
heart case liability from being virtually unbounded, it added an
alternative test-the strain must have been "greater than the ordinary wear and tear of life."
A. The Results in New York
The New York story may be opened with the following quotation from an opinion by Judge Pound, speaking for a unanimous
Court of Appeals in Lerner v. Rump Brothers:"
43. Zaremba v. Chrysler Corp., supra note 42, at 231, 139 N.W.2d at 748.
44. 241 N.Y. 153, 155, 149 N.E. 334, 335, 41 A.L.R. 1122 (1925). In Lerner, from

which this quotation is taken, decedent caught a cold as a result of spending ten
minutes in a refrigerator, following which he died of causes traceable to the lowered
resistance produced by the cold. Compensation was denied for want of anything
catastrophic or extraordinary. By contrast, in Matter of Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co.,
240 N.Y. 83, 147 N.E. 366 (1925), cited in the quotation, an undertaker's assistant
contracted an infection through a cut finger which spread through contact with a
pimple on his neck. This episode was held to be accidental in all its phases.
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A distinction exists between accidental injury and disease, but disease
may be an accidental injury. The exception arises out of abnormal
conditions which must be established to sustain an award. Two concurrent limitations have been placed on the right to recover an
award when a disease, not the natural and unavoidable result of the
employment, is developed during the course of the employment, although it does not follow that compensation should be awarded in
all cases coming literally within these limitations. First, the inception of the disease must be assignable to a determinate or single act,
identified in space or time. (Matter of Jeffreyes v. Sager Co., 198
App. Div. 446; 233 N.Y. 535) Secondly, it must also be assignable to
something catastrophic or extraordinary. (Matter of Connelly v.
Hunt Furniture Co., 240 N.Y. 83).
In the heart cases, the issue almost from the start centered on the
question whether there was anything unusual about the exertion
producing the attack or about the circumstances surrounding it. In
1935, compensation was denied to an employee who collapsed and
died shortly after having performed a routine job of lifting and
moving merchandise in a store basement.4 5 But, in 1939, an award
to a truck driver who died of a heart attack from the strain of cranking his truck was unanimously affirmed; 46 the catastrophic or unusual element seems to have been supplied by the fact that the condenser and distributor on the truck had burned out. The next year,
compensation was denied for the death of a blacksmith who, because
of icy weather, carried his tools three blocks to a stable instead of
having the horses come to the shop.47 And in 1941, compensation
was similarly denied to an employee whose heart attack was brought
on by the exertion, normal in his work, of pushing an overhead tree
48
loaded with 400 pounds of meat.
Shortly thereafter, the courts became somewhat more willing to
find that the activity causing the attack was "unusual." In 1942, the
heart attack of a housekeeper in an apartment house was deemed
accidental since it followed her climbing four flights of stairs three
times within fifteen or twenty minutes, the last time carrying a
heavy mirror.49 In 1943, the looser "unusualness" rule was adum45. Frankel v. National 5, 10 and 25 Cent Stores, 243 App. Div. 841, 278 N.Y.S. 450,
a'ffd, 268 N.Y. 509, 198 N.E. 378 (1935).
46. Green v. Geiger, 255 App. Div. 903, 7 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1938), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 610,
20 N.E.2d 559 (1939).
47. La Fountain v. La Fountain, 259 App. Div. 1095, 21 N.Y.S.2d 193, afJ'd, 284 N.Y.
729, 31 N.E.2d 199 (1940).
48. Dworak v. E. Greenbaum Co., 261 App. Div. 1023, 25 N.Y.S2d 829, aff'd, 287 N.Y.
555, 38 N.E.2d 224 (1941).
49. McCormack v. Wood Harmon Warranty Corp., 263 App. Div. 914, 32 N.Y.S2d
145, aff'd, 288 N.Y. 614, 42 N.X.2d 613 (1942).
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brated in the case of a furnace-stoker who collapsed after throwing
a dozen shovels of coal, each weighing about forty pounds, on the
fire. This was held to be an accidental injury, in spite of the fact that
the shoveling was his regular job. 50 During the next two years, a
plant patrolman's coronary occlusion was found accidental because
he had patroled an outside beat in extremely cold weather and
during a heavy snowstorm (although his job was to patrol in all
kinds of weather);51 the exertion of a fireman who ran up two flights
of stairs, halfway down, and then up again was deemed "unusual,"
(although realistically it was surely a routine activity for a fireman);5 2 and the necessity of remaining in a cramped position for an
hour to tamp new firebrick inside a boiler was deemed sufficient to
convert a strain into an accidental injury. 53 Beginning with Cooper
v. Brunswick Cigar Company54 in 1948, the newer view began to
affect even the language of the opinions, in that reference to the
unusualness of the exertion was sometimes altogether omitted. In
Cooper, an award was made for the death of a trucker who, because
he had no helper, had put in an unusually hard day, lifting cartons
two at a time in order to save time. The Appellate Division's opinion said that "the board could find that the heart attack which
caused the death was produced by the labor incident to the employment."5 51
From 1948 on, a series of cases emerged which threatened to
reduce the unusualness test to a hollow shell. In one case a painter
had placed his ladder so that he had to stretch his arm "all the way
out" in order to paint, and the Appellate Division held that the
"extreme exertion and extension of his arms in painting" satisfied
the requirement of accidental injury.55 In another instance, a deliveryman who suffered a heart attack while carrying a sixty-pound
case of beer was granted compensation: the only non-routine feature
in his case was the fact that the driveway on which he was walking
was somewhat slippery. 57 But-to show that the old requirement
50. Bohm v. L. R. S. & B. Realty Co., 264 App. Div. 962, 37 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1942),
afl'd, 289 N.Y. 808, 47 N.E.2d 52 (1943).
51. FlaInmer v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 268 App. Div. 944, 51 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1944), aff'd,
295 N.Y. 817, 66 N.E.2d 588 (1946).
52. Godsman v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp., 268 App. Div. 945, 51 N.Y.S.2d 368
(1944), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 708, 65 N.E.2d 339 (1946).
53. Brooks v. Elliott Bates, Inc., 269 App. Div. 792, 55 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1945), aff'd,
295 N.Y. 710, 65 N.E.2d 340 (1946) (two judges dissenting).
54. 273 App. Div. 1038, 79 N.Y.S.2d 867, aff'd, 298 N.Y. 731, 83 N.E.2d 142 (1948).
55. Id. at 1038, 79 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
56. Ruby v. Lustig, 274 App. Div. 954, 83 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 759,
87 N.E.2d 672 (1949).
57. Serie v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 273 App. Div. 833, 76 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1948).
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was still capable of defeating claims-in the same year and only nine
pages away in the same volume of reports, the same court denied
compensation for the death of a house superintendent who suffered
a coronary occlusion while carrying down stairs garbage cans which
weighed seventy pounds-ten pounds more than the beer case and
58
on stairs at that.
Then came a series of cases which held that accidental injury
could be shown merely by proof that the decedent had been working
harder than he had worked at some time in the past. For example,
one claimant, upon being promoted to the responsible job of supervising construction of three new shops, worked long hours seven
days a week for nine or ten months, experiencing heart symptoms
from time to time. The Appellate Division found this assignment to
be "unusual work," and held that "claimant sustained accidental
injuries arising out of and in the course of employment due to long
and arduous hours of work." 59 In 1949, an inspector was brought
within the protective orbit of "accident" solely because "the work
done by claimant had about a month earlier been changed so that
fewer men were doing the same volume of inspections which increased claimant's physical effort." 60 In other words, a strain which
had been usual and routine for a month was an "accident" because
a month earlier the claimant had had lighter work.
By 1950, the Court of Appeals apparently felt it had had
enough of this sort of thing, and, in Masse v. James H. Robinson
Company,61 while awarding compensation to a man who had
undergone unusually arduous work during the week preceding
a heart attack which occurred at home, it made the following
unqualified statement: "A heart injury such as coronary occlusion
or thrombosis when brought on by overexertion or strain in the
course of daily work is compensable, though a pre-existing pathology
may have been a contributing factor." 62 Nothing was said about
unusual strain; the language indicated that recovery would be permitted not only for overexertion, but also for "strain in the course
of daily work."
Later in the same year, while finding compensable the effects of
58. Chiara v. Villa Charlotte Bronte, Inc., 273 App. Div. 834, 76 N.Y.S.2d 59, aff'd, 298
N.Y. 604, 81 N.E.d 332 (1948).
59. Furtardo v. American Export Airlines, Inc., 274 App. Div. 954, 83 N.Y.S.2d 745,
746 (1948), leave to appeal denied, 298 N.Y. 933 (1949).
60. Carlin v. Colgate Aircraft Corp., 276 App. Div. 881, 93 N.Y.S.2d 791, 792 (1949),
aff'd, 301 N.Y. 754, 95 N.E.2d 626 (1950).
61. 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N.E.2d 56 (1950).
62. Id. at 37, 92 N.E.2d at 57.
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spending five or ten minutes in the usual cramped position a steam
fitter has to assume while working on the inside of a boiler, the
Appellate Division summarized New York law from Lerner to
Masse:
Appellants... cite the definition of an accident as something extraordinary or catastrophic, assignable to a determinate or single act,
identified in space or time. [Citing Lerner.]
As an abstract legal proposition undoubtedly this definition is
unassailable. However whether an event is to be found an industrial
accident is not to be determined by legal definition "but by the
common-sense viewpoint of the average man." [Citing Masse.] Hence
the issue almost invariably falls within the realm of fact, and if the
facts and circumstances sustain, upon any reasonable hypothesis,
the conclusion that an average man would view the event as accidental, then the determination of the Board is final. We think such
determinative facts and circumstances were presented in the instant
case, and that common men would regard decedent's injuries as
accidental. At least we cannot say as a matter of law that such is not
the case. Applications of this principle, though often not expressed,
are inherent in many decisions. 63
There is something indescribably poignant about the periodic
efforts of highly-trained legal minds to dispose of intricate and
troublesome questions of law by invoking "the common-sense viewpoint of the average man." Would the average man who saw a steam
fitter crouched in his usual position or a carpenter operating a mortising machine in the usual way view the resulting injuries as "accidental"? The plain fact is that the viewpoint of the average man
would quickly eliminate the entire tortuous usual-unusual exertion
distinction, since it is not common sense to equate the merely unusual with the accidental.
It is salutary at this point to recall the words of Lord Coke, Chief
Justice of England in the early seventeenth century, responding to
King James I's statement that the law was founded upon reason, that
the King as well as the judges possessed reason, and that the King
might therefore remove from the judges any causes he pleased and
decide them himself. Lord Coke answered:
[T]rue it was that God had endowed His Majesty with excellent
sciences and great endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not
learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which concern the life or inheritance, or goods or fortunes of his subjects, are
63. Broderick v. Liebmann Breweries, Inc., 277 App. Div. 422, 424, 100 N.Y.S.2d
837, 839 (1950); accord, Clayback v. Globe Woven Belting Co., 282 App. Div. 973, 125
N.Y.S.2d 493 (1953).
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not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and
judgment of [the] law .... 64
In the period following Masse, the "artificial reason and judgment
of the law" again came into play, and in place of the permissive and
vague "common sense" rule, there emerged a set of two, and perhaps
three, discernible tests operating side by side. Before distilling these
tests from the mass of reported cases, however, it might be useful to
set forth in summary factual form the panorama of awards and
denials since Masse.
The most common causal situation is that of a heart attack
caused by lifting; awards have been based in whole or in part on
lifting weights ranging from thirteen pounds to one hundred and
fifty pounds.6 5 Cases in which awards have been made have involved
the lifting of articles varying from four empty bottles,0 6 shoe boxes, 67
64. Conference between King James I and the Judges of England, Roberts'
Case, 12 Co. Rep. 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1344 (K.B. 1612). Note that in 1612 the word "artificial" did not carry the somewhat derogatory implication it conveys today. It was a
complimentary word, connoting highly-developed skill, learning, and inventiveness.
For example, note the inscription preceding the Sixth Pavin in ROBERT DOWLAND,
VARiETiE OF LuTr
LEssONS (1610): "Composed by the most Artificiall and famous Alfonso Terrabasco of Bologna."
65. Schutzel v. Gelobters Distribs., 24 App. Div. 2d 793, 263 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1965)
(10 to 30 pounds); Abbott v. Bedford Prod. Div., Nat'1 Dairy Prod. Corp., 15 App. Div.
2d 31, 221 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1961) (13 pounds); Puccio v. General Cable Corp., 13 App.
Div. 2d 558, 211 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1961) (15 pounds); Uletas v. Elliott, 18 App. Div. 2d 849,
236 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1963) (20 pounds); Castellano v. B & A Specialties Co., 23 App. Div.
2d 931, 259 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1965), aff'd, 269 N.Y.S.2d 720, 216 N.E.2d 712 (1966) (30
pounds); Williams v. Bumper & Auto Plating, Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 997, 229 N.Y.S.2d
731 (1962) (40 pounds); Greenberg v. Standard Overall Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 565, 212
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1961) (40 pounds); Erde v. Morris Erde, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 797, 192 N.Y.S.2d
784 (1959) (40 pounds); Colone v. Tavern on the Green, 21 App. Div. 2d 930, 251
N.Y.S.2d 129 (1964) (50 pounds); Geschwer v. Tee Jay Toys, Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 615,
222 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1961) (50 pounds); Gillar v. Jarcho Bros., 282 App. Div. 968, 125
N.Y.S.2d 465 (1953) (55 pounds); Post v. Walauer Paint Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 981, 254
N.Y.S.2d 720 (1964) (60 pounds); Witten v. Sargoy & Stein, 15 App. Div. 2d 617, 222
N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961) (64 pounds); Wood v. John C. Monroe, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 829,
209 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1961) (70 pounds); Sczesniak v. Whitney, 12 App. Div. 2d 366, 211
N.Y.S.2d 581 (1961) (70 pounds); Adler v. N. Adler's Son, Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 1050,
265 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1965) (75 pounds); Gordon v. Cenu Fibres, 10 App. Div. 2d 655, 196
N.Y.S.2d 349 (1960) (85 pounds); Webb v. Twelve Pine Street, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 555,
206 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1960) (90 pounds); Wagner v. City Prod. Corp., 11 App. Div. 2d 551,
199 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1960) (100 pounds); Brilli v. Brilli, 283 App. Div. 905, 130 N.Y.S.2d 142
(1954) (100 pounds); Rubin v. Elite Store Cleaners, Inc., 283 App. Div. 906, 130 N.Y.S.2d
58 (1954) (100 pounds); Gioia v. A. J. Courtmel Co., 283 App. Div. 40, 126 N.Y.S.2d
94 (1953) (100 pounds); Gostinsky v. Diamond Bake Shop, 11 App. Div. 2d 847, 203
N.Y.S.2d 160 (1960) (105 pounds); Johnson v. Swift & Co., 10 App. Div. 2d 656, 196
N.Y.S.2d 330 (1960) (138 pounds); Chenier v. H. W. Rohlfs &=
Son, 282 App. Div. 792, 122
N.Y.S.2d 463 (1953) (150 pounds).
66. Miller v. F. &cM. Schaefer Brewing Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 718, 226 N.Y.S.2d 927
(1962).
67. Farber v. Harbor Shoes Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 578, 206 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1960),
rcv'd on other grounds, 223 N.Y.S.2d 503, 179 N.E.2d 508 (1961).
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and an armful of dishes, 8 to heavy barrels,69 hot steel billets, 7 and
an accident victim. 71 Other types of exertion represented in successful cases include changing a tire,72 removing an automobile
bumper,73 moving a machine, 74 working in an awkward or cramped
position, 75 and general heavy strain. 76 On the other hand, recovery
has been denied in cases involving the lifting of things varying from
a four to six pound briefcase 77 to a fifty-pound nail keg. 78 Compensation has also been denied for heart attacks attendant upon the work
68. Burke v. Chef's Hat Restaurant, 16 App. Div. 2d 712, 226 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1962).
69. Holly v. Queensboro Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 819, 192 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1959).
70. Evans v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 838, 253 N.Y.S.2d 853
(1964).
71. Woodworth v. County of Onondaga-Sheriff's Dep't, 20 App. Div. 2d 945, 249
N.Y.S.2d 239 (1964); cf. Stewart v. Devon Realty Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 1005, 189
N.E.2d 626 (1963) (refuse cans); Sineni v. Sun Tire Sales-Phils Sunoco Service,
271 N.Y.S.2d 335 (App. Div. 1966) (cans of anti-freeze); Mandelblatt v. Gold Star
Baking Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 966, 254 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1964), aff'd, 265 N.Y.S.2d 289, 212
N.E.2d 775 (1965) (a bulky carton); Romanelli v. Hueblein Liquor Co., 14 App. Div. 2d
980, 221 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1961) (cases of liquor); Katz v. Greenberg Flooring, Inc., 13 App.
Div. 2d 561, 211 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1961) (lumber); Grear v. P. J. Garvey Carting & Storage,
Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 582, 200 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1960) (furniture); Silverman v. Calvert Coat
Mfg. Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 973, 193 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1959) (bundles containing 45 coat
sleeves); Wasserman v. Covington Fabrics Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 554, 189 N.Y.S.2d 503
(1959) (heavy inventory books); Luongo v. Caristo Constr. Corp., 284 App. Div. 1078, 135
N.Y.S.2d 821 (1954) (lumber); Sabasowitz v. Gold Theatre, 283 App. Div. 899, 130
N.Y.S.2d 121 (1954) (a heavy case of motion picture film); Bingold v. Krebs, 282 App.
Div. 786, 122 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1953) (a step ladder and two gallon cans of paint); Wolner
v. Ronnie Bake Shop, Inc., 281 App. Div. 932, 119 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1953) (a heavy pail of
water).
72. O'Brien v. Long Island State Parkway Comm'n, 13 App. Div. 2d 855, 214 N.Y.S.2d
786 (1961). See also the following cases which involved various kinds of pulling: Fisher
v. Merrill Ann Creations, 13 App. Div. 2d 562, 212 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1961); Deutsch v. Garey,
12 App. Div. 2d 830, 209 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1961); Hurt v. Burns Bros., 283 App. Div. 907,
129 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1954); Rivers v. Malone Bronze Powder Works, Inc., 277 App. Div.
1071, 100 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1950).
73. Baum v. B. & B. Auto Works, 15 App. Div. 2d 616, 222 N.Y.S.2d 559 (1961).
74. Moses v. Steel Drum Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 864, 186 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1959); see the
following cases which involved driving a truck or car: Grodsky v. Front St. Parking,
Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 586, 212 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1961); Napolitano v. Fusco, 9 App. Div. 2d
802, 192 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1959); Sanders v. Samuel Adler, Inc., 5 App. Div. 2d 1028, 173
N.Y.S.2d 322 (1958); cf. Bleich v. 63rd Building Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 584, 221 N.Y.S.2d
806 (1961) (removing snow); Jackson v. Board of Educ., 12 App. Div. 2d 542, 206 N.Y.S.2d
737 (1960) (removing snow).
75. Cronberg v. Lenmar Holding Corp., 17 App. Div. 2d 885, 233 N.Y.S.2d 370
(1962); Strickland v. Justice Motors, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 805, 192 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1959);
Bahn v. Wolfensohn, Inc., 286 App. Div. 902, 142 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1955).
76. Fish v. Smithville Volunteer Fire Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 573, 206 N.Y.S.2d 822
(1960); Fisher v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 612, 151 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1956); Landy
v. C. & S. Plumbing Co., 284 App. Div. 918, 134 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1954).
77. Goldman v. White & Case, 9 N.Y.2d 763, 215 N.Y.S.2d 71, 174 N.E.2d 744 (1961);
cf. Kane v. Canal Offset Plate Serv., Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 810, 263 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1965)
(a batch of flats weighing 15 pounds); Botwinick v. Arnolds Men Shop, Inc., 12 App.
Div. 2d 868, 210 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1961) (a 35-pound form).
78. Burris v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.2d 323, 141 N.E.2d 424 (1957).
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of cutting and attaching pipe, 79 and upon the normal work of a
mechanic. s0
Another common cause of heart attacks encountered in compensation cases is climbing. There have been numerous awards
involving heart attacks caused by climbing both stairs 81 and laddersA2 although there have also been some denials of claims arising
83
out of such circumstances.
An increasingly prolific category of cases is that in which the
causative element is found in excitement, fear, anger, worry, nervous
strain, or tension caused by overwork, rather than in some physical
exertion. Among the fact situations that have grounded awards are:
an unusually heavy and strenuous period of litigation for an attorney; 14 the emotional strain of possible removal for failure to meet
a project deadline coupled with worry about incurring excessive
costs; 8 5 an argument with the employee's superior;8 6 the excitement

of a night watchman observing suspicious acts of two men;87 and the
79. Bobb v. Weaderhorn Constr. Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 888, 186 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1959).
80. Hawthorne v. Eagle Delivery Truck Renting Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 824, 247
N.Y.S.2d 448 (1964).
81. E.g., Himovitch v. Chiaet Ornamental Iron Works, 24 App. Div. 2d 799, 263
N.Y.S.2d 971 (1965); Nutis v. Saloway's Restaurant, 16 App. Div. 2d 846, 227 N.Y.S.2d

591 (1962); Corso v. Tandy & Allen Associates, 10 App. Div. 2d 741, 197 N.Y.S.2d 510
(1960); Riccobono v. Continental Cas. Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 718, 152 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1956);
Neyman v. Charlie Baker Clothier, 283 App. Div. 755, 128 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1954); Klein v.
Louis Candel, Inc., 280 App. Div. 1029, 116 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1952); Kehoe v. London
Guar. & Acc. Ins. Co., 278 App. Div. 731, 103 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1951).
82. E.g., Harmonay v. Harmonay, 24 App. Div. 2d 800, 263 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1965);
Hutton v. Ford Motor Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 589, 189 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1959).
83. E.g., Bloom v. Israel Cohen & Son, 16 App. Div. 2d 841, 227 N.Y.S.2d 747
(1962) (stairs); O'Brien v. Ronneberg, 8 App. Div. 2d 880, 186 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1959)
(ladder).
84. Schechter v. State ins. Fund, 6 N.Y.2d 506, 160 N.E.2d 901 (1959); cf. Goodwin v.
Workmen's Compensation Bd., 20 App. Div. 2d 951, 249 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1964) (a workmen's
compensation referee who had to handle an extra case load and deal with several
emotional claimants); Mueller v. Rutgers Club, Inc., 278 App. Div. 619, 101 N.Y.S.2d
953 (1951) (long hours and unusual excitement causing the death of a social club
steward).
85. Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 551, 207 N.Y.S.2d 72
(1960), rev'd, 10 N.Y.2d 209, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14, 176 N.E.2d 714 (1961); cf. Ferreri v. General
Auto Driving School, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 601, 271 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1966) (suspended
inspector on way to take lie detector test); Hamilton v. Transport Workers Union, 21
App. Div. 2d 434, 251 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1964) (the emotional strain of a union employee
caused by a hearing concerning his alleged malfeasance).
86. Wilson v. Tippetts-Abbott-McCarthy-Stratton, 22 App. Div. 2d 720, 253 N.Y.S.2d
149 (1964); Chavkin v. Rotter, 20 App. Div. 2d 158, 245 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1963).
87. Albarella v. Glick Dev., Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 920, 244 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1963); cf.
Lobman v. Bernhard Altmann Corp., 19 App. Div. 2d 931, 244 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1963) (the
strain of a promotional trip on a sales manager); Antonini v. Progressive Electronics, 15
App. Div. 2d 842, 224 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1962) (fright when awakening to find one's truck on
fire); Cappozalo v. City Housing Authority, 1 App. Div. 2d 709, 146 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1955)
(the stress of conducting lectures without the usual assistance).
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strain of attempting to avoid a traffic accident.88 Perhaps because of
the somewhat more elusive nature of emotional causation, the proportion of denials of recovery is higher in this category than in the
others. Thus, there are unsuccessful cases involving hard-working
attorneys,8 9 emotion-ridden bookkeepers, 0 and tension-racked business executives. 91 In addition, there are a number of frustrated
claims which were based on arguments9 2 and altercations.93
This catalog of heart cases arranged according to factual background may be concluded by a brief reference to a category whichat least as to its ability to satisfy the "by accident" concept-is one
of the least controversial: that in which the heart failure is associated with some obvious mishap, such as a trauma, 4 a fall, 95 or a
slip.98
B. The Legal Tests

We are now ready to attempt to decipher the pattern of legal
tests that lies buried in this mass of cases. These tests are to be found
partly in the occasional efforts of the New York courts to verbalize
their rules and partly in the mosaic made by their actual decisions,
a large proportion of which announce a result based on the particular facts without providing any specific articulation of the legal
principle which is being applied.
The clue to understanding the current state of the law in New
York is the realization that, while the courts still insist upon some
kind of "unusualness" in the precipitating event, that unusualness
can take at least two, and perhaps three, different forms. The word
"unusual" is a relative term; the event must therefore be unusual
88. Eckhaus v. Adeck Stores, Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 569, 200 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1960), rev'd,
11 N.Y.2d 862, 227 N.Y.S.2d 680, 182 N.E.2d 287 (1962); Wiltcher v. National Transp. Co.,
283 App. Div. 977, 130 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1954).
89. Greenfield v. Goldrich, 271 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1966); Gallagher v. County of Oswego,
14 App. Div. 2d 463, 216 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1961).
90. Roth v. Model Pawnbrokers, 16 App. Div. 2d 841, 227 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1962). See
also Gordon v. Temple Beth El, 18 App. Div. 2d 855, 236 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1963), aff'd,
14 N.Y.2d 742, 199 N.E.2d 508, 250 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1964).
91. Lesnik v. National Carloading Corp., 285 App. Div. 649, 140 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1955),
aff'd, 309 N.Y. 958, 132 N.E2d 326 (1956).
92. Cramer v. Barney's Clothing Store, 13 N.Y.2d 711, 191 N.E.2d 901, 241 N.Y.S.2d
844 (1963); Zygler v. Tenzer Coat Co., 19 App. Div. 2d 660, 240 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1963), aff'd,
15 N.Y.2d 562, 203 N.E.2d 217, 254 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1964); Coleman v. Guide-Kalkhoff-Burr,
Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 857, 178 N.E.2d 912, 222 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1961); Santacroce v. 40 W. 20th
St., Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 855, 178 N.E.2d 912, 222 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1961).
93. Unterberg v. Department of Labor, 16 App. Div. 2d 668, 242 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1963).
94. De Luca v. Garrett & Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 569, 206 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1960).
95. Friedman v. Fada, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 866, 209 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1961).
96. Wasserman v. Covington Fabrics Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 554, 189 N.Y.S.2d 503
(1959).
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in relation to some specified norm which is accepted as "usual."
While a large number of New York cases use the word "unusual"
without identifying the norm taken as "usual," there are a sufficient
number of cases specifying the benchmark of "usualness" to support
the following breakdown:
An event (exertion, excitement, etc.) is sufficiently unusual to impart accidental character if it is unusual in relation to any one of the three following norms:
(a) The employee's own usual work;
(b) The "wear and tear" of ordinary non-employment
life; or
(c) The usual work of other employees.
The addition of test (b) is the most significant development
since the Masse case in the refinement of the New York rule. The
test seems to be traceable to the case of Burris v. Lewis, 97 which demonstrated that, while Masse would permit an award even though the
claimant had merely been engaged in his regular duties, Masse
did not open the floodgates to permit awards for the results of any
exertion, however ordinary. Rather, the New York Court of Appeals
read Masse as meaning that an exertion which was regular and
routine in relation to an employee's usual employment duties could
be the basis of an award if, and only if, it was greater than the ordinary wear and tear of non-employment life.98 The court also scrupulously insisted on the medical causation factor by adding that the
heart attack must be shown to have been caused by the unusually
hard work thus demanded.
The Masse case decided that the, precipitating cause need not be
something more strenuous than the normal performance of the work
demanded, provided that the ordinary course of the work was sufficiently strenuous to require more than normal exertion. But where,
as here, a heart has deteriorated so that any exertion becomes an
overexertion, where the mere circumstance that the employee was
engaged in some kind of physical labor is what impels the doctor
to testify that his work caused his death, we would have reached a
point, if this award were to be upheld, where all that is necessary
to sustain an award is that the employee shall have died of heart
disease. 99
97. 2 N.Y.2d 323, 141 N.E.2d 424 (1957).
98. See also Carrasquillo v. Santini Bros.-The Original, 13 N.Y.2d 245, 196 N.E.2d
52, 246 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1963); Stein v. 200 Lafayette St. Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 996, 254
N.Y.S.2d 956 (1964); Jackson v. Board of Educ., 12 App. Div. 2d 542, 206 N.Y.S.2d 737
(1960).
99. 2 N.Y.2d at 326, 141 N.E2d at 426.
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The "wear and tear" rule has been pressed into service in New
York since 1957 both to support awards 00 and to defeat them. 101
This test appears to be aimed essentially at distinguishing between
heart attacks that are the result of the "natural progression" of
heart disease and those that are not, and the distinction is sometimes
explicitly phrased in these terms, both in awards, 10 2 and in denials. 10 3 However, it must be stressed that the "wear and tear" rule
has not displaced the rule that heart attacks are compensable when
caused by exertion greater than that normally required of the employee; the new rule merely supplements the old, or forms an exception to it. In other words, it is only necessary to appeal to the "wear
and tear" rule when the facts show no more than regular exertion
in the employee's normal activities.
The fact that the new test is an alternative is amply demonstrated
by the large number of awards that are still made on the basis of
unusualness in relation to the employee's own regular work. This
unusualness can take many forms. An obvious example is the case
in which, at the time of his heart attack, the employee was engaged
in duties that were themselves different from or in addition to his
normal duties. Now and then an executive or salesman, not toughened to the demands of muscular exertion by his accustomed sedentary or verbal activities, has occasion to lift some object whose
weight proves to be too much for him. 0 4 But unusualness may also
be found when the shift is from one kind of physical work to another, as from watering lawns to pitching leaves into a truck, 0 5 or
100. E.g., Dodson v. Frank Vanecek & Son, 24 App. Div. 2d 787, 263 N.Y.S.2d 774
(1965); Lerner v. Terrycab Co., 20 App. Div. 2d 615, 245 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1963); Shefick v.
Lefrak, 11 App. Div. 2d 828, 202 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1960); Burke v. New York World
Telegram & Sun, 10 App. Div. 2d 742, 198 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1960); Johnson v. Swift & Co.,
10 App. Div. 2d 656, 196 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1960); Gibalski v. Elmira Country Club, 8 App.
Div. 2d 883, 187 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1959); Moses v. Steel Drum Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 864, 186
N.Y.S.2d 953 (1959).
101. E.g., Goldman v. White 9- Case, 9 N.Y.2d 763, 174 N.E.2d 744, 215 N.Y.S.2d 71
(1961); Burris v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.2d 323, 141 N.E.2d 424 (1957); Hawthorne v. Eagle
Delivery Truck Renting Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 824, 247 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1964); O'Brien v.
Ronneberg, 8 App. Div. 2d 880, 186 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1959).
102. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bedford Prod. Div., Natl Dairy Prod. Corp., 15 App. Div.
2d 31, 221 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1961); Moses v. Steel Drum Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 864, 186
N.Y.S.2d 953 (1959).
103. See, e.g., Bloom v. Israel Cohen & Son, 16 App. Div. 2d 841, 227 N.Y.S.2d 747
(1962); Bobb v. Weaderhorn Constr. Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 888, 186 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1959).
104. Adler v. N. Adler's Son, Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 1050, 265 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1965);
Witten v. Sargoy 8- Stein, 15 App. Div. 2d 617, 222 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961); O'Brien v. Long
Island State Parkway Comm'n, 13 App. Div. 2d 855, 214 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1961); Gordon v.
Cenu Fibres, 10 App. Div. 2d 655, 196 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1960); Erde v. Morris Erde, Inc., 9
App. Div. 2d 797, 192 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1959); Sabasowitz v. Gold Theatre, 283 App. Div.
899, 130 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1954).
105. Gibalski v. Elmira Country Club, 8 App. Div. 2d 883, 187 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1959).
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from a carpenter's repair and alteration work to the operating of a
mortising machine. 106 In one interesting case, the comparison was
made not with the normal demands of the employee's present job,
but rather with the demands of his previous job; an award was accordingly made for the death of a bulldozer operator who, two weeks
earlier, had the less strenuous job of an oiler. 07 Somewhat less
obviously unusual is the performance of a task or exertion which,
while not of frequent occurrence, does recur with some degree of
regularity. For example, one employee had extra duties each
Wednesday evening and had a fatal heart attack after one such
evening's work. 08 Another had a heart attack as the result of an
activity he normally undertook once a month.109 Compensation was
awarded in both instances. It is thus quite clear that unusualness
may be a matter of degree, as well as of kind.110 It may appear in the
14
duration,"' strenuousness,"12 distance,"13 or other circumstances "
involved in the execution of routine assignments.
Three norms were mentioned above as operating side by side
when the usualness of an exertion is determined in New York: the
employee's own normal strain; the wear and tear of non-employment
life; and the normal strain of other employees. The vast majority of
the cases fall within the first two categories. The third is illustrated by
a pair of cases involving emotional strain. In one, the heart failure
was allegedly caused by the employee's argument with a superior.
Compensation was denied on the express ground that the emotional
106. Clayback v. Globe Woven Belting Co., 282 App. Div. 973, 125 N.Y.S.2d 493
(1953).
107. Hudson v. Waddington Constr., 14 App. Div. 2d 463, 217 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1961).
108. Domash v. Standard Coat, Apron & Linen Serv., 11 App. Div. 2d 575, 201
N.Y.S.2d 142 (1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 889, 175 N.E.2d 831, 216 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1961). See also
Kushner v. Landau, Newman & Rosen, 13 App. Div. 2d 564, 211 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1961).

109. Wheaton v. Chevrolet-Buffalo Div. of General Motors Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d
591, 189 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1959); cf. Deutsch v. H. & S. Dairy Prod., Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d
845, 209 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1961); Bottke v. Globe Stationery & Toy Co., 278 App. Div. 621,
101 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1951).
110. See Schechter v. State Ins. Fund, 6 N.Y.2d 506, 160 N.E.2d 901 (1959).
111. Martinelli v. Metropolis Trucking Co., 8 N.Y.2d 806, 168 N.E.2d 254 (1960).
Johnson v. Gristede Bros., 278 App. Div. 732, 103 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1951), on the authority
of Westbrook v. Southside Sportmen's Club, 274 App. Div. 954, 83 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1948),
aff'd, 299 N.Y. 748, 87 N.E.2d 669 (1949).
112. Carpenter v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 302 N.Y. 304, 97 N.E.2d 915 (1951);
Brilli v. Brilli, 283 App. Div. 905, 130 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1954).
113. Burke v. New York World Telegram & Sun, 10 App. Div. 2d 742, 198 N.Y.S.2d
108 (1960).
114. Brocklebank v. Union Carbide Int'l Co., 17 App. Div. 2d 1009, 234 N.Y.S.2d
69 (1962), affd', 13 N.Y.2d 1036, 195 N.E.2d 313, 245 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1963); Burke v. Chef's
Hat Restaurant, 16 App. Div. 2d 712, 226 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1962); Sanders v. Samuel Adler,
Inc., 5 App. Div. 2d 1028, 173 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1958); Sleator v. National City Bank, 285
App. Div. 393, 137 N.Y.S.2d 289, aff'd, 309 N.Y. 708, 128 N.E.2d 415 (1955).
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strain involved was no greater than that to which all workers are
subjected."15 Three years later, in another case involving an argument with a superior-this one conducted through an intermediary
located midway between the parties--compensation was awarded
on the express ground that there was "greater emotional strain or
tension than that to which all workers are occasionally subjected." 116
It is difficult to see how a test based on the "normal strain of all other
employees" could be successfully extrapolated beyond the immediate
fact situation, that of emotional stress growing out of a work argument. Even in that situation, it is a questionable norm; for is there
some fixed measurable quantity of emotional tension common to all
employments? In any event, there is plainly no such fixed quantity
as to physical exertion, such as lifting or climbing. In short, it is
doubtful that the already complex law as to the compensability of
heart attacks is enriched or clarified by adding this third norm to
the tests based on the employee's own normal strain and on the
stress of non-employment life.
IV. A

CRITIcAL APPRAISAL

We have traced in some detail the experience of one major jurisdiction which abruptly reversed its rule from the unusual-exertion
rule to the usual-exertion and accidental-result formula, and of
another major jurisdiction which has demonstrated both the problems created by the unusual-exertion test and the need for a more
sophisticated criterion. We may now attempt a critical appraisal of
the competing doctrines. The central question is whether the unusual-exertion test is a valid and workable test by which to determine the accidental character of an injury. It is subject to criticism
on three grounds.
The first is its assumption that the accidental character of an
injury must be found in the cause rather than in the result. Except
1
when express statutory language inserts some such requirement, 17
there is nothing in the "accident" concept which demands this
limitation, and, as shown above, the accidental-result interpretation
115. Santacroce v. 40 W. 20th St., Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 855, 222 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1961).
116. Wilson v. Tippetts, 22 App. Div. 2d 720, 721, 253 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150 (1964).
117. The 1961 amendments to MoNT. R v. CoDEs ANN. § 92-418 (1947) define an
injury as happening "from an unexpected cause." The prior wording referred to "some
fortuitous event." See also statutes expressly adopting the unexpected or accidental
result theory: "'[A]ccident' shall mean only an unexpected or unusual event or result."
FLA. STAT. § 440 (1965). Ohio has defined injury as: "any injury, whether caused by
accidental means or accidental in character and result." Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.01
(Page 1965). (Emphasis added.)
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was already well embedded in the phrase "by accident" by the time
the phrase was taken over by the states from the British Act. 118
Georgia is a good example of a state which has carried to its ultimate
expression the reasoning that an unexpected result is sufficient to
supply the accidental element, whether the cause is extraordinary or
not. 119 It adopted the following formula: "An accident arises out of
the employment when the required exertion producing the accident
is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree
of exertion or the condition of health."' 20 In one case inwhich this
rule was applied, the Georgia court actually deemed accidental a
heart failure following exertion which was lighter than usual, since
the exertion did in fact precipitate the attack.' 2' In this case, the
decedent had asked to be put on less strenuous work because he was
not feeling well, and at the time of his death he was only carrying
one-by-four boards, none of which weighed over twenty poundsabout the weight of a portable typewriter or a pail of water. Yet it
was established by the medical testimony that, because of his extremely bad heart condition, even this exertion was capable of precipitating the collapse. In the same month, Georgia also awarded
compensation for a heart attack suffered five minutes after a book122
keeper had walked up a single flight of stairs to his office.
The second criticism of the unusual-exertion requirement-an
equally elementary criticism going to the plain meaning of the word
"accident"-involves the assumption that whatever is unusual is
accidental. Whether one takes the everyday colloquial meaning or
the most technical dictionary meaning of the term accidental, this
assumption is not true. Whether a thing is accidental depends on
whether it is unexpected or unintended. One can deliberately do the
unusual and one often does. If an employee intentionally and knowingly undertakes to lift an unusual load, the lifting is no more accidental than if he had deliberately lifted a normal load. Or if a
gardener deliberately continues to mow the law in the rain,-as an
observer would not say that the gardener was experiencing an accident merely because it is unusual to mow lawns in the rain. Yet on
118. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
119. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pulliam, 99 Ga. App. 406, 108 S.E.2d 823 (1959);
Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 67 Ga. App. 649, 21 S.E.2d 478 (1952).
120. Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 67 Ga. App. 649, 653, 21 S.E.2d 478, 481 (1952);
accord, Triebsch v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 218 Ark. 379, 237 S.W.2d 26 (1951).
121. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Kitchens, 81 Ga. App. 470, 59 S.E.2d 270 (1950).
122. Bussey v. Globe Indem. Co., 81 Ga. App. 401, 59 S.E.2d 34 (1950).
123. See Dotola v. Hill, 257 App. Div. 870, 11 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1939) (held, contraction
of sciatica accidental under such circumstances).
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this broken reed-the identification of unusual with accidentallean the hundreds of cases that have swollen the compensation reports with distinctions between the usual and the unusual in working
conditions.
The third criticism is that, in practice, the usual-unusual distinction is unworkable. The distinction assumes that there is a quantum
of exertion or exposure in any occupation which is usual or normal
-an assumption which is questionable at best, and certainly difficult
to apply. Any employee looking forward to his coming year's work
knows that he will work long hours as well as short hours, in cold
weather as well as hot, sometimes faster and sometimes more
slowly.124 The butcher will lift both light and heavy sides of beef,
and one day he will encounter the heaviest side of beef he has lifted
all year. Will that be a usual lift?125 The fireman will have easy fires
and difficult fires; the loader will lift little boxes and bigger boxes
and biggest boxes; the policeman will arrest complaisant drunks and
difficult drunks. 126 None of this is either unusual or unexpected;
yet a surprising number of cases will hold an exertion unusual when
it is nothing more than the heaviest part of the claimant's usual
27
work..
Holmes' statement that the life of the law has been not logic but
experience is probably truer in compensation law than in any other
field. Although most of the law built up around 'the "accident" requirement, for example, has been based on false premises and embroidered with irrelevant distinctions, there has been a utilitarian
purpose behind it all which cannot be disregarded when all of the
logical criticisms have been exhausted. That practical consideration is the fear that heart and related cases will get out of control,
and will become compensable whenever they take place within the
time and space limits of employment, unless some kind of arbitrary
boundaries are set. Most states have chosen to press the "accident"
124. See Walsh v. United States Rubber Co., 238 S.C. 411, 120 S.E.2d 685 (1961), in
which the claimant suffered a heart attack. The court found that continual interruption by the claimant's superiors, who ordered him to abandon his usual duties as stockman in order to fetch special materials, constituted unusual exertion when he tried to
"double-up" in order to get his regular work done by the end of the day and compensation was awarded.
125. Industrial Comm'n v. Luger, 54 Ohio. App. 148, 6 N.E.2d 573 (1936) (held,
accidental).
126. See De Esch v. Borough of Emmaus, 143 Pa. Super. 225, 18 A.2d 89 (1941)
(held, coronary thrombosis accidental).
127. See, e.g., York v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 131 Pa. Super. 496, 200 At. 280
(1938), in which compensation was awarded because, although dumping cars was the
miner's usual work, it was the hardest part of it.
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concept into service as one of these arbitrary boundaries, but, with
a few exceptions, one gets the impression that what is behind it all
is not so much an insistence on accidental quality for its own sake
as the provision of an added assurance that compensation will not
be awarded for deaths not really caused in any substantial degree
by the employment.
Unfortunately, the unusual-exertion requirement is a clumsy and
ill-fitting device with which to ensure causal connection, although
it undoubtedly does frequently rule out cases in which work-connection is questionable. The fallacy of testing work-connection by
a comparison of a man's particular fatal 6xertion with his usual
exertion is that, in many occupations, even the usual exertion is
clearly capable of causing the heart collapse. Conversely, in many
occupations the usual exertion requires so little effort that, even
when it is exceeded, it is medically improbable that the "unusual"
exertion could cause heart failure. It is not as though continuous
heavy work over a long period produced a strong heart, while desk
work for the same period resulted in a weak heart. The longshoreman and the salesman may have hearts which, weakened by disease,
are no different in their ability to withstand strain. In Philadelphia Dairy Products Company v. Farran,128 a salesman indulged in
the (for him) unusual effort of carrying a fifteen-pound parcel, while
the claimant in Marlowe v. Huron Mountain Club129 lifted 200pound sacks of mail, which for him was routine. Farran got compensation; Marlowe did not. The point is that, as a matter of medical
causation, the only question is the ability of the particular strain
to affect the particular diseased heart; the character of the claimant's
previous exertions is of much less relevance to this issue than is the
medical question whether, given this heart and this exertion, the
exertion in fact contributed to the collapse. One would assume that
a causal connection could more readily be shown when the object
lifted was 200 pounds than when it was fifteen.
V.

A SUGGESTED SOLUTION

The beginning point in any attempt to articulate a sound working rule for the heart cases is the recognition of the fact that, while
limits must be put on heart liability, the essence of the problem
128. 44 Del. 380, 57 A.2d 88 (Super. Ct.), aff'd, 44 Del. 437, 61 A.2d 400 (Sup. Ct.
1948).
129. 271 Mich. 107, 260 N.W. 130 (1935). Marlowe was decided under the earlier
Michigan rule. See notes 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text.
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is causation. The fact that an increasing number of jurisdictions
accept this beginning point is a step in the right direction, but
there is one additional preliminary step which is indispensable to
an orderly analysis, and that is to recognize that the causation question has two distinct parts: the legal and the medical. The law must
define what kind of exertion satisfies the test of "arising out of the
employment"; then the doctors must say whether the exertion which
has been held legally sufficient to support compensation has in fact
caused the heart attack. All too often these two tests are scrambled
together. When this happens, the courts usually lose sight of one
of them. Thus, obsession with the legal test of unusual exertion may
lead to a holding that a very slight exertion, because it satisfies the
legal test in that it is unusual for the particular employee, is adequate to support an award, although its ability to account medically for the collapse seems remote. Conversely, obsession with medical causation sometimes leads to a slighting of the need for precision
in defining the legal rule, with the result that decisions may be based
on statements by doctors that an exertion did or did not cause a
heart attack, although neither the doctors nor the lawyers may have
had a clear concept of what the term "cause" meant in this setting.
The first task, then, is to state plainly the legal test of causation.
If we can keep to one side the complications that have been introduced by attempts to cram this problem into the "accident" mold,
we will see that the causation issue can be solved by invoking the
distinction which exists in compensation law between neutral-risk
situations (where there is no obvious personal or employment element contributing to the risk) and personal-risk situations (where
a personal risk contributes to the injury, although perhaps in a
relatively small degree). 3 0 As to situations which do not involve any
personal risk element, the better rule goes beyond the old rule,
which demanded that the employment contribute an increased
or peculiar risk, and accepts actual risk,' 3 ' or even positional risk.13 2
The reason is that there is no competing personal risk to overcome.
Any employment contribution, even merely putting the employee
in the place where the injury from a neutral force occurred, is
enough, because it is greater than the zero employee contribution.
But when the employee contributes some personal element of risk
-e.g., by having a personal enemy who assaults him, 33 or a personal
130. See 1 LASON, LAw
131. Id. §§ 8.43 & 9A0.
132. Id. § 10.
135. Id. j 11.23.
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7 (1965).
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disease which figures causally in his injury' 84-the employment must
contribute something substantial to increase the risk. The reason
is that the employment risk must offset the causal contribution of
the personal risk. The result in idiopathic fall cases in most jurisdictions is that there is no compensation unless some height or object
35
associated with the work adds to the risk.
In heart cases, the effect of applying this distinction between
neutral-risk and personal-risk situations would be clear. If there is
some personal causal contribution in the form of a previously weakened or diseased heart, a heart attack would be compensable only if
the employment contribution takes the form of an exertion greater
than that of non-employment life. Note that the comparison is not
with this employee's usual exertion in his employment, but rather
with the exertions present in the normal non-employment life of this
or any other person. On the other hand, if there is no personal causal
contribution, that is, if there is no prior weakness or disease, any
exertion connected with the employment and causally connected
with the collapse as a matter of medical fact would be adequate to
satisfy the legal test of causation. This is the heart-case application
of the actual risk test: this exertion in fact causally contributed to
this collapse. In both situations, whether or not there was prior personal weakness or disease, the claimant would also have to show that
medically the particular exertion contributed causally to the heart
attack.
To highlight the difference in practice between the old unusualexertion test and the suggested rule, let us postulate two extreme
cases. Suppose first that X's job involves the frequent lifting of 200pound bags, and that one such 200-pound lift medically produces a
heart attack. Under the old unusual-exertion rule there would be no
compensation, regardless of any previously existing heart condition,
because the activity was not unusual for X. 13 Under the suggested
rule there would be compensation, even in the presence of a history
of heart disease, because people generally do not lift 200-pound
weights as a part of non-employment life, and therefore the employment contributed a strain which was beyond the ordinary wear
and tear of life. At the other extreme, suppose that Y's usual job in134. Id. §§ 12.10-.14.
135. Id. § 12.14.
136. See Marlowe v. Huron Mountain Club, 271 Mich. 107, 260 N.W. 130 (1935).
See also Latimer v. Sevier County Farmers Co-op., Inc., 233 Ark. 762, 346 S.W.2d 673
(1961), in which lifting four 100-pound sacks was insufficient evidence of a causal
relation between the employment and a fatal coronary thrombosis.
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volves no lifting. Suppose he lifts a fifteen-pound weight on the job,
and suppose there is medical testimony that this lift caused his
heart attack. Under the old test, which was concerned exclusively with the comparison between an employee's usual exertions
37
and the precipitating exertion, there would be compensation.
Under the suggested rule, the result would depend on whether there
was a personal causal element in the form of a previously weakened
heart. If there was no history of heart disease, compensation would
be awarded since the employment contributed something to the
employee's collapse and his personal life contributed nothing. If the
employee had a previously weakened heart, compensation would be
denied in spite of the medical causal contribution of his employment, because legally the personal causal contribution was substantial, while the employment added nothing to the usual wear and tear
of life-which certainly includes lifting objects weighing 15 pounds,
such as bags of golf clubs, step ladders, or sets of The Law of Workmen's Compensation (with Annual Supplement). 3 8
The suggested rule has borrowed from the most recent New
York test, the "wear and tear" concept. The decisive advance
over the old unusual-exertion test is the alteration in the norm
of exertion with which the precipitating exertion is compared.
The old norm was the particular employee's usual exertion. The
new norm is the exertion of ordinary non-employment life. What
New York now must do, in order to bring its heart case story to an
orderly conclusion, is hold that the "wear and tear" rule applies only
in cases of prior heart weakness, adapt its own actual-risk test to all
other cases by giving awards in these cases for heart attacks caused
by usual exertion, and sweep away the vestiges of the old unusualexertion-for-this-employee test.
As for Michigan, its energies have been so thoroughly devoted
to the one gigantic effort of throwing off the unsual-exertion
requirement that it has hardly had time to face the more subtle problems of keeping the heart cases within appropriate bound157. See Philadelphia Dairy Prods. Co. v. Farran, 44 Del. 380, 57 A.2d 88 (Super Ct.),
aff'd, 44 Del. 437, 61 A.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
158. It is this feature that distinguishes the proposed rule from the rule that accepts
in all heart cases any exertion as long as medical causation is shown. In other words,
under the proposed rule, there will be cases in which employment exertion was
medically capable of accounting for the collapse, and in which denials will neverthe-

less result because the exertion does not rise above the "wear and tear of life" level.
See, e.g., Di Cicco v. Liebmann Breweries, Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 613, 201 N.Y.S.2d 123
(1960), in which medical testimony that any effort would trigger the fatal attack resulted in the court denying the compensation award because the ordinary wear and
tear of life would have produced the same result.
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aries without the aid of the unusual-exertion test. However, one
point should be emphasized immediately to dispel any apparent
inconsistency between the proposed solution and some passages in
the Sheppard case. In that case, the Michigan Supreme Court went
to considerable lengths to denounce and destroy the distinction
between cases involving previous disease and weakness, and cases
involving previously healthy claimants. However, it condemned this
distinction specifically for the purpose of demonstrating, quite correctly, that there should not be a difference in the "by accident" rule
applicable to the two types of cases. The point of the distinction
between previously healthy and previously diseased claimants in
the rule suggested in this article is purely one of causation.
Clearly there should not be one "by accident" rule for workers
with prior heart disease and another for those with no such history.
Equally clearly, it would be unrealistic to deny that the presence
or absence of pre-existing heart disease has relevance in determining whether the final heart collapse was causally related to the employment or occurred merely by coincidence during working hours.
If the workman had a previously healthy heart, the question whether
the heart attack was simply the result of the natural progression of
the disease could not arise, while, in a case involving advanced heart
deterioration, the causal contribution of the personal pre-existing
disease may loom so large that it blots out any possible finding of
employment causation.
After the resolution of this question about Sheppard, there should
be no particular difficulty in adopting the suggested rule in Michigan.
The controversial cases until now have been wrestling primarily
with the accident concept and can be distinguished on that ground,
whereas the suggested rule constitutes merely an adaptation and
refinement of basic principles drawn from the words "arising out of
... employment." Indeed, the same route for the adoption of the
proposed rule is open to practically every other jurisdiction, whether
it has already accepted the usual-exertion test or whether it is merely
ripe for such a change.
It must be recognized that the proposed rule raises one problem: in close cases a great deal necessarily turns on the question
whether there was a pre-existing disease or weakness. If, as in a large
proportion of claims, there is a provable history of heart disease,
the resolution of this question presents little difficulty. But when
there is no provable history of heart disease, doctors may still say
that there must have been such a history, on the theory that a healthy
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heart could not have given way under the particular exertion. 3 9
All that can be said here is that this has to be a determination of
medical fact. Presumably the burden of proof would be upon the
party alleging the existence of a prior heart condition as a fact
essential to his case. More frequent use of autopsies, when possible,
may be justified in cases in which this issue can be foreseen. Sometimes an autopsy can be distinctly helpful, as, for example, in the
Burris 40 case, where the autopsy revealed no new lesions--only old
ones.
Under the proposed solution, the decisional law on heart cases
should not be substantially different under a "by accident" statute
than under statutes like those of California, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Texas, which do not contain such
words in their coverage tests.' 41 If any court is disposed to worry

about whether abandoning the unusual-exertion test would "open
the flood gates,'

142

it might find reassurance in the fact that getting

an exertion award in such states as California, 143 Iowa,: 44 Massachusetts, 45 Minnesota,' 46 and Rhode Island 47 is no "pushover." In those
states, the difference is that the battle is avowedly fought on the fun48
damental causation issue.
Up to this point, our concern has been with the first half of the
139. See, e.g., the inconclusive posture of this question in Coombe v. Penegor, 348
Mich. 635, 83 N.W.2d 603 (1957). The question is not settled by the opinion itself, but
we find the following reference to the problem in the opinion of Justice Smith in
Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 604, 83 N.W.2d 614, 626 (1957):
A majority is also affirming Ewart Coombe's award. Did he have a pre-existing
ailment? His attending doctor says he "must" have had. The appeal board says
he "may" have had. The defendants say he did have. Notwithstanding, it is proposed that his award of compensation under part 2 be affirmed. Authority? Eula
Sheppard's case. Apparently it is no longer critical whether there was a pre-existing
"disease or condition" or not. We agree. It never was.
140. Burris v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.2d 323, 141 N.E.2d 424 (1957).
141. See note 1 supra.
142. See the comment of Judge Latimer in his dissent in Purity Biscuit Company
that the rule in that case "opens the flood gates and every internal failure becomes an
accident just because it happens." Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah
1, 30, 201 P.2d 961, 975 (1949).
143. See, e.g., denials of compensation in Daniels v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 148
Cal. App. 2d 500, 306 P.2d 905 (1957); Lancaster v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 5 Cal. App.
2d 304, 42 P.2d 333 (1935); Quail v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 138 Cal. App. 412, 32 P.2d
402 (1934); McNamara v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 130 Cal. App. 284, 20 P.2d 53 (1933);
Singlaub v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 87 Cal. App. 324, 262 Pac. 411 (1927).
144. See, e.g., Hemker v. Drobney, 253 Iowa 421, 112 N.W.2d 672 (1962); Lindahl v.
L. 0. Boggs Co., 236 Iowa 296, 18 N.W.2d 607 (1945).
145. See, e.g., Herlihy's Case, 267 Mass. 232, 166 N.E. 556 (1929).
146. See, e.g., Schuppel v. United Van Bus Co., 257 Minn. 444, 102 N.W.2d 24
(1960).
147. See, e.g., Williams v. United Wire & Supply Corp., 194 A.2d 686 (R.L 1963).
148. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 2d 555,
166 P.2d 908 (1946).
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proposed causation test in exertion cases: the question of the degree
of exertion necessary to satisfy the legal test of work-connection. We
now come to the second half of the test: the question whether, as a
matter of medical fact, the exertion contributed causally to the
collapse. A good statement of the need for medical-factual causal
connection has been supplied by the Supreme Court of Georgia:
[I]t must be shown by evidence, opinion or otherwise, that the
exertion attendant upon the duties of employment, no matter how
slight or how strenuous, and no matter with what other factorssuch as preexisting disease or predisposition to attack-it may be
combined, was sufficient to contribute toward the precipitation of
the attack. Where evidence as to the work engaged in shows it to
be sufficiently strenuous, or of such a nature that, combined with
the other facts of the case, it raises a natural inference through
human experience that it did so contribute, this is sufficient. In
other cases, the opinions of experts that the exertion shown by the
evidence to exist would be sufficient is also sufficient to authorize a
that it did. But, in
finding on the part of the fact-finding tribunal
49
one way or another, the fact must appear.1
If heart failure overtakes the employee while he is waiting for a
bus,150 or an elevator,' 51 or walking, 5 2 or riding in a car,15 3 or doing
routine clerical work, 54 there simply may be no strain at all in the
employment activity which could cause a heart attack. The natural
progress of the disease may bring the disease to its fatal climax during
working hours, 5 5 but if the employee's activity at the time involves
no effort, or effort which cannot medically support a causal connection, it can rightly be said that the outcome was not causally related
to the employment.
149. Hoffman v. National Sur. Corp., 91 Ga. App. 414, 417, 85 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1955);
see Trippe v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 101 Ga. App. 373, 114 S.E.2d 72 (1960),
in which a heart attack was held not compensable because merely filling an oil cup
from a gallon can was insufficient exertion. See also Finch v. Evins Amusement Co.,
80 Ga. App. 457, 56 S.E.2d 489 (1949).
150. See Ackerman v. H. B. Wiggins Sons, 19 N.J. Misc. 519, 21 A.2d 628 (1941).
151. Hyshiver v. Hotel Laurelton, 246 App. Div. 660, 283 N.Y.S. 285 (1935); cf.
C. P. Chaney Sawmill, Inc. v. Robertson, 233 Ark. 711, 348 S.W.2d 703 (1961).
152. See Harper v. Henry J. Kaiser Constr. Co., 233 Ark. 398, 344 S.W.2d 856 (1961).
153. See Prejean v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 125 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 1960).
154. See Union Producing Co. v. Dependents of Simpson, 251 Miss. 183, 168 So. 2d
808 (1964).
155. See Tritschler v. Merck & Co., 66 N.J. Super. 116, 168 A.2d 666 (1961); Black v.
Mahoney Troast Constr. Co., 65 N.J. Super. 897, 168 A.2d 62 (1961); cf. Wheeler v.
Industrial Comm'n, 94 Ariz. 199, 382 P.2d 675 (1963); Industrial Comm'n v. Wolfer, 152
Colo. 205, 381 P.2d 19 (1963); U. S. Steel Corp. v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 599, 154 N.E.2d Ill
(1958); Hemker v. Drobney, 253 Iowa 421, 112 N.W.2d 672 (1962); Schuppel v. United
Van Bus Co., 257 Minn. 444, 102 N.W.2d 24 (1960); Hahne & Co. v. Guenther, 114 N.J.L.
571, 178 Ad. 58 (1935); Knight v. Berkine Corp., 210 Tenn. 318, 358 S.W.2d 323 (1962).
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Proof that employment was not a medical cause of a heart attack
can be provided in several ways. There may be direct physical evidence, perhaps afforded by an autopsy, 156 negating the existence of
any new heart lesions or pathology. 157 There may also be medical
opinion evidence denying the causal connection. In such cases,
under familiar rules, an appellate court will not disturb a denial of
compensation. 5 8 Or the medical testimony on which the claim rests
may be too speculative or weak to meet the claimant's burden of
proof. 59 In fact, the medical situation may sometimes be impossible
to analyze. In such a case, if unaided by evidence connecting the
60
injury with the employment, the claim may fail.
It is difficult enough in the heart cases merely to apply medical
theory to observed facts, but the difficulty is compounded by the
persisting cleavage in medical theory itself on the relation of exertion to thrombosis. Cases continue to reach the appellate courts on
61
records in which the medical testimony is certain that exertion'
156. See Burris v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.2d 323, 141 N.E.2d 424 (1957).
157. See Industrial Comm'n v. Daniels, 124 Colo. 829, 236 P.2d 291 (1951); Goldman
v. White & Case, 9 App. Div. 2d 160, 193 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1959), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 763, 174
N.E.2d 743, 215 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1961).
158. Chapman v. C. Finkbeiner, 230 Ark. 655, 324 S.W.2d 348 (1959); Rorabaugh v.
General Mills, Inc., 187 Kan. 363, 356 P.2d 796 (1960); Scott v. Kentland-Elkhom Coal
Co., 335 S.W.2d 919 (Ky. App. 1960); Batemarco v. New York Times Co., 9 App. Div.
2d 569, 189 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1959). Wiederkehr v. Chambless-Rosen Drilling Co., 360
P.2d 513 (Okla. 1961); Welch v. Schuler Fruit Co., 350 P.2d 604 (Okla. 1960).
159. See Jones v. Industrial Comm'n, 148 Colo. 253, 365 P.2d 689 (1961); Thiel v.
Department of Labor & Indus., 56 Wash. 2d 259, 352 P.2d 185 (1960).
160. Fromer v. Stern Bros., 8 App. Div. 2d 868, 186 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1959).
161. Trudenich v. Marshall, 34 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Wash. 1940); see Chiara v.
Villa Charlotte Bronte, 273 App. Div. 834, 76 N.Y.S.2d 59, aff'd, 298 N.Y. 604, 81 N.E2d
332 (1948) in which compensation was denied for the heart attack incurred by a janitor
while carrying 75-pound garbage cans down stairs. This decision, which is out of line
with the main stream of the New York cases, is explained by the following excerpt:
The employer's physician said: "... physical effort is not the cause of coronary
sclerosis and coronary sclerosis is the cause of coronary thrombosis, therefore there
is no causal relation .... No, effort is not the cause of coronary occlusion, and

there is no question that the patient had a coronary occlusion; there are cases just
as often when coronary occlusion occurs, while people are at rest and sometimes
in bed."
Id. at 834, 76 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
Even if, as some doctors often say, coronary thrombosis can just as well occur at
home in bed, it does not follow that a particular exertion or excitement did not
contribute to it. See, e.g., Marotte v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 145 Colo. 99, 357
P.2d 915 (1960), involving a policeman who was "shook-up" in a minor auto accident.
Two days later, while still feeling "bad", he killed a garter snake for a group of excited
women. Four days thereafter his own doctor diagnosed his condition as a myocardial
infarction. The court awarded compensation and held that the fact that an infarction
could occur while the claimant was at rest did not rebut the evidence that it occurred
as the result of his employment. See also Bundy v. Concrete Ready-Mix Co., 130 Ind.
App. 542, 167 N.E.2d 477 (1960), in which the medical expert, when asked whether
physical strain could have caused the heart condition, testified that the answer was
much debated. For those people under age 40, strain could be the cause, while, after
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and emotion162 have nothing to do with coronary thrombosis, while
1 63
most heart cases are based on the opposite theory.
However, although medical evidence in a particular case may
be uncertain or deficient, this will not necessarily bar an award if
the exertion, taken with other facts, raises a natural inference of
causal contribution.'6 4 In a recent New York case, 65 the medical
expert admitted that he did not know how a thrombus would occur
in a normal, healthy blood vessel, or why the thrombosis and infarction had not occurred previously when the claimant had performed
much more strenuous labor. Nevertheless, the court affirmed an
award, saying that "the nonmedical facts thus present a classic case of
industrial-accident heart attack."' 66
This question of the medical relation of exertion to thrombosis
is something that will have to be left to the doctors. Meanwhile, it
is up to the lawyers, administrators, and judges who are concerned
with heart cases in workmen's compensation law to put the legal
house in order. It is hoped that the solution suggested here may
help toward that end.
age 40, perhaps 60% are caused by strain and the others from natural causes. Compensation was denied. See also Fendell v. Industrial Comm'n, 89 Ariz. 180, 359 P.2d
988 (1961), in which the coronary occlusion of a 69-year-old employee suffered while
unloading a shipment of 50-pound packages was held causally unrelated to the employment on the basis of medical testimony that the attack was merely coincidental
with the strenuous but usual labor.
162. See Aromando v. Rubin Bros. Drug Sales Co., 47 N.J. Super. 286, 136 A.2d 11
(1957), in which compensation was awarded although there was a split in the medical
testimony on whether unusual emotional stress could cause a coronary occlusion.
163. See Justice Hill's dissent in Chiara v. Villa Charlotte Bronte, 273 App. Div. 834,
76 N.Y.S.2d 59, aft'd, 298 N.Y. 604, 81 N.E.2d 332 (1948).
164. See Thomas v. United States Cas. Co., 106 Ga. App. 441, 127 S.E.2d 169, rev'd,
218 Ga. 493, 128 S.E.2d 749 (1962); Hoffman v. National Sur. Corp., 91 Ga. App. 414,
85 S.E.2d 784 (1955). The lower court opinion in Thomas contains an extensive bibliography of literature on heart disease and employment. The court in that opinion concluded that an award could not be substantiated upon natural inferences through
human experience, but the Georgia Supreme Court reinstated the award.
Natural inferences may also negate a causal connection. See Cole v. Industrial
Comm'n, 144 Colo. 183, 355 P.2d 537 (1960), in which compensation was denied because
circumstances tended to disprove any connection between the accident and the thrombosis.
165. Marinaro v. Shapiro, 10 App. Div. 2d 462, 200 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1960), affid, 10
N.Y.2d 910, 179 N.E.2d 520, 223 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1961).
166. Id. at 462, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 688.

